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FOREWORD 
I have frequently been urged to publish the lectures which I 
have for som~ years given annually in various cities. The sugges-
tion came both from those who had been unable. to attend the lec-
tures and, more especially, from those who wished to review 
them at their leisure. 
The difficulty has heretofore been the problem of distribution. 
A possible solution has presented itself through the facilities of 
The Island Press, a cooperative publishing house, and the World 
Events Committee, which has developed extensive connections 
throughout the United States and Canada. 
I have accordingly decided to try the experiment of publishing 
one of the two series of lectures which I gave during the 1944-
1945 lecture season, but brought up to date. If the experiment is 
successful, I plan to make it an annual practice, under the series 
title Social Science Lectures. 
The publishing of the present volume is a cooperative non-
profit undertaking. I have prepared and contributed the manu-
script without remuneration; the costs of printing and binding 
have been covered by loans without interest from readers of 
World Events; the Island Press, which is attending to the manu-
facture and distribution, is a genuine non-profit cooperative, and 
the members of the World Events Committee, who worked out 
the financial details and will assist in the distribution, are giv-
ing their services without compensation. 
Any surplus of recei pts over expenses will be employed to 
extend the distribution of this and similar publications. The co-
operation of all who are interested will be welcome. 
Jamaica, Vermont 
July 1, 1945. 
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SCOTT NEARING 
PREFACE 
There is peculiar timeliness in a discussion of the role of the 
Soviet Union in world affairs-(l) because the part played, and 
to be played, by the Soviet Union is so substantial, (2) because it 
is so little understood and (3) because it is so frequently misrep-
resented. I have studied closely the Russian Revolution and the 
Soviet Union, have made six trips to Soviet Russia and have had 
opportunities to discuss Soviet policy with many well informed 
persons. While I have no idea that I can set the reading public 
right on the much discussed issue of Soviet foreign policy, I hope 
that I can make some contribution toward brushing away the cob-
webs of traditionalism and providing a reasonable viewpoint 
from which to consid~r the position of the Soviet Union in the 
world of today and tomorrow. 
Anyone attempting to write or speak on a general subj ect such 
as the relations between the Soviet Union and other nations is 
confronted by three serious difficulties: (1) the bigness and 
complexity of the matter, (2) its unfamiliarity to an outsider 
(foreigner) and (3) the great body of prejudices, preconceptions 
and half-truths that all of us carry about. These difficulties are 
present in the consideration of many controversial questions, but 
in the case of the Soviet Union, with its land mass flung across 
two continents, its conglomeration of cultures, races, peoples and 
nationalities and its bold attempt to replace an old social system 
by a new one, the difficulties are magnified and multiplied. 
Writers and speakers on the Soviet Union fall into two main 
classes, those who deal with some technical subj ect, such as the 
construction of hydro-electric plants or the handling of tubercu-
10sis' and those who discuss the economic and social structure and 
policies. The first group has an easy time of it, since it is neces-
sary merely to survey and report; the second group is hampered 
by personal bias and harassed by special interests. 
If there is a wholly unprejudiced report on the Soviet Union, 
I have never seen it. Some writers, like the Webbs, make an 
effort at neutrality. I make no such pretense. I am not neutral 
on the Soviet Union. I have been a partisan of the Russian Revo-
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-lution since its inception and I am still a partisan of it. Anything 
I say or write on the subj ect will necessarily be colored by that 
partisanship. 
Why am I partisan? I am not Russian, nor were any of my 
ancestors, so far as I know. I am not and never have been in the 
pay of the Soviet government and, with the exception of two 
years, 1927-29, I have not been and am not a member of the 
Communist Party. But I am a student of sociology and I am pro-
foundly convinced that a time has come in the development of 
social theory and practice when mankind can undertake what 
Lester F. Ward called ((the conscious improvement of society by 
society" . 
I have lived my life in an outmoded social order that is tearing 
itself to pieces in a manner which has proved highly expensive in 
terms of material wealth, health, life, hopes, aspirations and 
ideals. As a teacher of social science, I came in contact with the 
youthful victims of this social death agony and was casting about 
for some proposal or proposals that would provide a way out for 
the lost generation. 
This search led me through the literature of social reform and 
social revolution. At the outset I was inclined to believe that the 
established order could be reformed-that is, preserved in prin-
ciple and changed only in detail. The economic breakdowns that 
preceded W orId War I and then the war itself convinced me that 
the present social order is unsound in principle and must there-
fore be radically altered-that is to say, uprooted and replaced. 
I was not and am not committed to . any particular technique of 
social revolution. I disagree with Bolshevik theory and practice in 
a number of important particulars. But, while we in the west 
swallowed the bitter pill of economic paralysis and war, the -Bol-
sheviks worked out an alternative theory and, at the risk of their 
lives, tried to put it into practice. Here was a group of people 
with a passionate belief in an ideal, a willingness to make 
immense sacrifices in its behalf and wide backing among a sturdy, 
uncorrupted people. 
Had the Zapata brothers in Mexico or Sun Yat-sen and his 
Chinese followers or Gandhi and his Indian multitudes stepped 
out with equal boldness, I would have been equally partisan in 
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their behalf. I felt and feel confident that capitalist imperialism 
has outlived its usefulness. I am convinced that any effort to keep 
the old carcass alive by the injection of artificial stimulants will 
result in disillusionment and much unnecessary suffering. I wel-
come any and every attempt to find a workable substitute. 
Soviet Russia to date embodies the most ambitious attempt to 
find a way out of the world-wide social crisis precipitated by the 
decay of capitalist imperialism and accentuated by the rush of 
technological changes and the rapid spread of social science. In 
the same sense that the years from 1780 to 1840 are known as the 
era of the French Revolution, the years from 1900 to 1950 will 
be known in history as the era of the Russian Revolution. 
Bolshevism has already profoundly altered the social pattern of 
this half-century. Its influence will extend far into the future. 
Anyone who pretends to be well informed on the major social 
movements of our time must devote serious study to the rise and 
development of the Soviet Union. Anyone who is concerned for 
the future of mankind must do his thinking, plan his social stra-
tegy and formulate his program of social action only after a care-
ful survey of Soviet experience. 
In the field of world politics Soviet influence has been felt ever 
since the revolution of 1917. During the past five years the Soviet 
Union has played a leading political role in both Europe and 
Asia. There is every reason to believe that this role will be 
enlarged and will extend to the Americas and perhaps to Africa. 
Under these circumstances the subject of the role of the Soviet 
Union in world affairs becomes a matter of prime importance for 
every thinking person. 
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I. THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 
AND THE SOVIET UNION 
Events have moved so fast and so far during the last few decades 
that it is comparatively difficult for a person living in the current 
year to look back over the period that preceded the Russion Revolu-
tion. Three things can be said about this pre-revolutionary Victorian 
Age. First, the British merchant fleet, the British navy, the British 
pound sterling and the British agencies of propaganda spread their 
influence even more widely than did the world-girdling British 
Empire. It was a. British Age and had been British since the down-
fall of Napoleon. 
Second, the age was characterized by a sense of stability and 
permanence that expressed itself in peace, prosperity and a wide~ 
spread belief in the inevitability of progress. A century elapsed 
between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the beginning of 
World War I. During that century people learned to believe that 
men were too civilized to fight another great war and that the 
rapidly spreading supply of gadgets that came with mass produc~ 
tion was ushering in an age of plenty as well as of peace. 
Third, the years preceding the Russian Revolution witnessed the 
rise of the labor movement. Trade unions, cooperative societies, 
political labor parties, fraternal and benefit organizations, sport 
associations, literary clubs, large numbers of daily, weekly and 
monthly publications, and libraries of books and pamphlets saw 
the light of day during the century that ended with World War I. 
One of the most remarkable features of the labor movement was 
that it came from the masses, who selected their leaders, formulated 
their policies, initiated, established, financed and defended their 
enterprises by great personal sacrifices and often in the face of 
bitter ruling-class opposition. 
While the Victorian Age beguiled the heedless -and the ilI~ 
informed with its superficial appearance of security and stability, 
underneath the surface of the western world there was a ferment 
that always attends the efforts of a social class, heretofore exploited 
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or frustrated, to secure the reins of power. The Victorian Age 
seemed stable. Actually, it was evolving the agencies of its own 
destruction. 
Profound economic changes underlay the life of the Victorian 
world. The most spectacular of these changes had to do with com-
munications and transportation: telegraph, telephone, radio, print-
ing press, camera, locomotive, steamship, automobile, airplane. 
The most fundamental of the changes was the phenomenal 
stepping-up of. profit accumulation in the industrial centres, where 
labor power was concentrated, propagated, psychologized and 
systematically exploited. Beyond these transformations lay the de-
veloping use of electric energy, the employment of petroleum as 
a lubricant and as a fuel, the widespread and cheap production 
of machine tools, the growth of synthetics and other factors that 
increased human control over nature and facilitated the conversion 
of raw materials into finished goods. With this power age went 
the mass production of consumer goods, bringing both quantity 
and variety of utensils, gadgets and trinkets into the homes of the 
masses. Mass production was achieved as the result of a newly 
established science of industrial management and organization 
that introduced local planning, budgeting, cost-accounting and 
bookkeeping as permanent factors in the business world. 
Fundamental changes in the means of production are of neces-
sity accompanied by equally "\Yidespread changes in political or-
ganization and social relationships. The transformation of 19th 
century economy as a result of power techniques moved popula-
tion~ from old lands into new areas, converted country folk .into 
city dwellers, replaced the farm by the factory and office, and thus 
laid the foundation for the mass living, mass work, mass educa-
tion, mass recreation, mass thinking and mass emotional reactions 
that are met with in the modern urban community. 
The political scene shifted no less rapidly than the economic. 
Lenin characterized the epoch from 1870 to 1914 as "the struggle 
to redivide the planet". It was during these years that the great 
powers of Europe, followed by the United States and later by 
Japan, extended their colonial conquests across Africa and through 
large parts of Asia. At the same time, they were building bigger 
navies and perfecting their armies. A dozen local wars, mostly 
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in Europe, were followed by a period of general war that lasted 
from 1911 to 1922. 
War was accompanied by revolution. Colonial revolts broke 
out in Cuba, the Philippines, and South Africa. The Russian ' 
Revolution of 1905 was followed by the Mexican Revolution of 
1910 and the Chinese Revolution of 1911. The Russian Revolu-
tion of 1917 spread through Central Europe, North Africa and 
the Near East, and fanned the flames, of the quiescent Chinese 
Revolution. 
Revolution was answered by counter-revolution. From 1918 
when Russian landlords, business men, bureaucrats, militarists and 
monarchists organized their drive to destroy the Soviet power, 
the counter-revolutionary forces of Europe dominated the politi-
cal scene for decades. British, German and American troops in .. 
vaded the Soviet Union while the ruling classes in whose interests 
they were operating, financed the anti-Soviet Russians. From the 
Fascist march on Rome in 1922 to the Nazi seizure of power in 
1933, popular and republican governments were swept out of 
existence in one European country after another, and in their 
place appeared dictatorships, directing managed economies and 
building up military machines. 
The new World War was rehearsed in Spain from 1936 to 
1939. It spread through Europe after 1939 and became a general 
war in 1941. 
Peace, progress, prosperity and permanence were taken for 
granted during the Victorian Age. This seemingly stable social 
order was disrupted by a spectacular series of economic changes, 
political and military conflicts between the major powers, revolu-
tions and counter-revolutions that wrecked Europe and the world 
during the closing years of the 19th and the opening years of the 
present century. This is the background of the Soviet Union. 
These are the death agonies of an old social system and the birth 
pangs of a new one. It was under thes,e world-shaking conditions 
that the Russian Revolution took place. 
Two facts should never be forgotten about the Russian Revolu-
tion. The first is that it was the crest of a revolutionary wave that 
moved across the Americas, Asia, Africa and Europe during the 
first quarter of the 20~ century. The second fact is that the prQ-
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fessional revolutionaries of Russia were for the most part eltl1e.1 
in exile or in prison when the revolution occurred. 
There is always a tendency to personalize historical events and 
to localize or nationalize them among particular groups of people. 
Thus the names of Lenin and Trotsky are connected with the 
Russian Revolution and the Russian Revolution itself is singled 
out as though it were the only event of its kind during this 
particular period. 
Such interpretations are grotesque distortions of the historic 
picture. Lenin and Trotsky were both out of Russia when the 
Revolution broke. The Russian Revolution of I9I7 occurred seven 
years after the Mexican Revolution and six years after the revolu-
tion in China. It is true that Lenin and Trotsky were both out-
standing revolutionary leaders. It is also true that the Russian 
Revolution marked the crest of the revolutionary wave. Headlines 
therefore centre on these personalities and on this event, although 
the personalities and the event were Hone out of many". 
There is another matter that should never be forgotten in a 
discussion of the Russian Revolution. The overturn did not come 
because revolutionaries wanted it or worked for it. Undoubtedly 
their plans and efforts had some effect in shaping its course and 
even in giving it birth. But the major factor behind the Russian 
Revolution was the inability of the Tzarist regime to function 
under the conditions of modern total war. 
Tzarist Russia was an anachronism in I9I7. Despite abundant 
mineral resources, the country was still overwhelmingly agricul-
tural. Its relations vvith Britain, for example, were substantially 
those of colony and mother country. Russia shipped raw materials 
to Britain and in exchange the British sold the Russians manu-
factured goods and invested capital in Russian enterprises. British 
and other foreign capitalists even provided technicians to direct 
their exploitive activities in Russia because the Russian educational 
system was so inadequate that it failed to supply the necessary 
number of trained specialists. In political theory, Tzarist Russia 
was a great power. In economic fact, its development lagged more 
than a hundred years behind that of Britain and at least seventy-five 
years behind Germany. 
Russia's cultural lag expressed itself equally in the social realm. 
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Not only was the peasantry illiterate but in an age of printing 
press, camera, and other ready means of con1munication, govern-
ment policy limited education, restricted freedom of the press, 
and thus denied the masses any possibility of breaking through 
the ignorance and superstition that enveloped them. 
Britain, 'Germany, France and other European pow·ers had passed 
out of the era of landlord domination inlto that of business domina .. 
tion during the 18th and 19th centuries. Serfdom was not officially 
abolished in Russia until 1861, and when the Revolution of 1917 
occurred public policy in Russia was still decided in the main by a 
bureaucracy that drew its support from the landholders, the army, 
the church and the state apparatus. It is not correct to describe the 
Russia of 1910 as feudal, because large manufacturing plants 
were operating in Petrograd, Kharkov and other cities, extensive 
railroad and telegraph systems were functioning, and Russian mer-
chants were actively engaged in world commerce. But the business 
interests were definitely subordinate to those of the ruling bureau-
cracy, and through the entire period that followed the efforts of 
Peter the Great to westernize Russia the business interests fought 
an uphill fight for a share in the determination of public policy. 
When World War I began, Russia was backward economically, 
the masses of its people were backward culturally, it had a small 
and inadequately trained middle class, and its ruling class was 
divided. Such a social set-up might carryon economically and 
politically in peace time or during a brief, small-scale war. It was 
in no position to handle total war in competition with highly 
industrialized, coordinated, modernized Germany. 
Two years of war brought Russia to the verge of economic 
collapse. Incidentally, of course, the Russian armies had suffered 
severe reverses. But the major difficulties were food and munitions 
for the fighting fronts, transport facilities, raw materials for in-
dustry, fuel and food for the cities. The Russian breakdown in 
1916 was a breakdown in supply that affected every branch of 
Russian life. The army suffered most, the peasantry least. 
Tzarism's political apparatus crumpled in 1917 after the econom-
ic and social apparatus had begun to go to pieces. When Liberals 
took over in March, the Socialists in midsummer, and the Bolshe-
viks in November, they assumed control of a bankrupt community. 
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An outdated social system had failed to stand the strain of total 
war. Tzarism had gone to pieces under the pressure of the struggle 
to redivide the wealth and power of the imperialist world. The 
Liberals, Socialists, and Bolsheviks were trustees in bankruptcy 
whose duty it was to assemble what assets they could lay their 
hands on and reestablish some kind of normal social relationships. 
Both the Liberals and the Socialists, for example, tried to con-
tinue in the war. Liberals, Socialists and Bolsheviks all attempted 
to revive production, restore transport, stabilize fuel and food 
supplies and liberate war-weary, hungry, disease-ridden masses 
who were desperately seeking peace, bread and a measure of 
freedom. It is customary in the United States and elsewhere to 
think of the Russian Revolution as a violent and successful attempt 
to overthrow Tzarism. Tzarism overthrew itself with the assistance 
of. its Central European neighbors. The revolution was an attempt 
to modernize an antiquated social machine and set it to running 
along reasonably efficient lines. 
Behind the revoh:~tion lay a century of social theory, of wide-
ranging discussion and of ardent propaganda. The social theory 
found its origins in England and France. Locke, Hume, Rousseau, 
Godwin, Fourier, Comte, and many other thinkers in the two 
countries were responsible for the 19th century outpouring of 
revolutionary theory and attempts at the organization of cooperative 
communes. Germany made its contribution through the monu-
mental work of Hegel and Marx. Russia produced Bakunin, Kropot-
kin and Tolstoy. These theoreticians differed sharply, one from 
the other, and when it came to connecting theory and practice, 
their planned patterns of a new society were miles apart. But it 
was upon their thinking and writing that the ideology of the 
labor movement depended. The leaders of the Russian Revolution 
had read and discussed these theories in great detail. They were 
the heirs of a distinguished group of social planners. They enjoyed 
another great advantage. The revolution and the civil war which 
followed it liquidated the superstructure of Tzarist society very 
thoroughly. The old had gone. The new had a free field. 
Residues of the old social order remained, of course. These 
existed more generally in the villages than anywhere else. The 
peasants retained their agricultural and craft techniques, their 
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folkways, their social attitudes, their respect and contempt for 
authority. Although the superstructure of both the Tzarist church 
and state had disappeared, the peasants still respected the symbols 
of both instItutions. T~s, the chairman of a peasant committee, 
sent from his village to Moscow, reported the marvels he had 
witnessed and ended, ((Last of all I saw Tzar Lenin himself. God 
bless him!" 
Other elements of the old order still persisted. Middle class 
and upper class individuals were passively or actively anti-bolshe~ 
vik. Much of the church apparatus was intact and anti-revoln 
tionary. Large numbers of Russians had gone abroad at the time 
of the Revolution, hoping for foreign aid in the re-establishment 
of their privileges. These and other factors laid the foundacions 
for a potent counter-revolution. 
Counter-revolutionary efforts against the Bolshevik regime took 
several forms. First there was the civil war, accompanied by mili-
tary invasion from Japan, Britain, the United States, Germany and 
Poland. Czech troops participated in the counter-revolutionary 
struggle. Then came the era of encirclement by armed state capital-
ism. Japan on the east and Germany and Italy on the west built up 
powerful military machines, and in the Anti -Comintern Pact made 
what amounted to a joint plan for destroying the Bolshevik regime. 
Between 1932 and 1941 Great Britain and the United States joined 
the anti-Comintern bloc in their war on the republics. The imme-
diate occasion for this counter-revolutionary move was the world-
wide economic breakdown that began in 1929 and the Spanish 
Revolution of 1931. Within six years all of the European republics 
except Switzerland had been either destroyed or neutralized. Then 
came Munich (1938) with its program for the liquidation of the 
Soviet Union. 
Bolshevism survived all of these attacks. The Soviet regime in 
Russia, like the Sovi,et regime in China, persisted. Unlike the 
Soviet Regime in China, however, the Bolsheviks succeeded in 
maintaining their control of the entire social apparatus. From this 
vantage point they were able to carryon planned socialist con-
struction. 
From the day the Bolsheviks took power down to the present 
moment there have never been two periods when the Soviet Union 
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was exactly the same. All social life changes; and social life in 
the Soviet Union has changed with unusual rapidity through the 
entire course of its existence. It is therefore impossible to give a 
description of the Soviet Union at any particular stage in its evo-
lution without knowing that before the description had been com-
pleted the thing described will have been modified in some degree. 
Perhaps the most satisfactory way to characterize the Soviet Union 
is to set down some of the immediate achievements of the revolu-
tion, some of the early efforts at social construction and then to 
list some of the factors that distinguish present-day Soviet society 
from the social systems existing in other parts of the world. 
Peace, abundance and freedom were the slogans under which 
the Bolsheviks took power. As followers of Marxian theory, their 
first task was to end exploitation in the Soviet Union and to assist 
in terminating exploitation in other parts of the world. John 
Reed, in his Ten Days that Shook the World} gives a well-docu-
mented picture of this stage in Soviet history. Land, productive 
tools, buildings and utilities were declared social property. Some 
of them were held by the cooperatives, some by municipalities and 
other local government agencies and some by the central govern-
ment. The means of exploitation-the ownership of jobs, were 
thus transferred from private to public control. A line of distinc-
tion was drawn between those forms of property which the indi-
vidual used to satisfy his own needs, and those forms through 
which the owner could compel others to do his bidding. Hand 
tools and implements, small dwellings and personal belongings 
remained private property. All other property became public. 
Bolshevik control of Russian life had been secured under the 
slogan (tAll power to the Soviets". The Soviets were bodies of 
delegates elected by farmers, workers and soldiers. In the early 
stages, farmers elected representatives from their villages, workers 
from their factories and soldiers from their military formations. 
As the soviet system developed, each village, town and city had its 
village, town and city councilor soviet. There were regional 
soviets, corresponding to state legislatures in the United States. 
Republics such as the Ukraine and White Russia had their all-
republic soviets. Over all was the All-Union Soviet, a central par-
liament composed of representatives from the entire Soviet Union. 
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!zarist . Russia had restricted or suppressed mass organization. 
With the revolution such organizations blossomed in wide vari-
ety. The country went organization-crazy. 
Since the Bolsheviks held their authority as a result of mass 
support, they began the organization of a society in terms, of these 
mass interests. The peasants secured the use of the land. The 
workers took control of productive enterprises. Public authorities 
began the organization of schools, health services, recreation fa-
cilities. The Soviet Union was to be a country of, by and for the 
masses. 
Although Soviet leaders had promised peace to their followers, 
immediately after the Revolution they found themselves in a civil 
war against a score of counter-revolutionary armies, with invading 
forces moving in from east and west. One of the first tasks of the 
new government was therefore the establishment of the Red Army. 
Throughout the entire course of Soviet history the Red Army has 
received a large share of the national income, has been accorded a 
high place among Soviet institutions and has played an important 
role in shaping Soviet policy. The threat of war and the Axis. in-
vasion in 1941 made the Red Army the focal Soviet organization. 
Soviet leaders realized the necessity of unifying the population 
over whom they exercised authority. In order to achieve this result 
they proposed to abolish all forms of discrimination against races 
and nationalities; to organize a federation of socialist soviet re-
publics, each of which should enjoy a large measure of auton-
omy; to place men and women on the same political, social and 
economic basis; to make rural economy as efficient as urban econ-
omy and thus to end the distinction between the backward country 
and the advanced city; to raise the cultural level of the more back-
ward areas of the Soviet Union as rapidly as possible to the level 
of the more advanced areas. All of these provisions were aimed at 
one general obj ect: the ending of inequality and the establishment 
of equal opportunity fo~ the rising generation of Soviet citizens. 
Class-divided society, argued the Bolshevik leaders, is torn by 
schisms and conflicts. In the Soviet Union we shall set up a mono-
lithic, class-free community in which the interests of all and the 
interests of each are synonymous. Civil strife will cease, the Soviet 
government will be the spokesman for the common and unified 
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aim of the community, which is the elevation of public well-being. 
Monolithic society, freed from tensions by the abolition of class 
divisions, would not be torn by rival interests speaking through 
competing social groups and political parties. In the new society 
one political party would exist, the party of the workers. Into this 
party would be drawn a membership composed of the militant 
vanguard of farmers, industrial workers, technical workers, pro-
fessional w-orkers. Entrance into the party would be preceded by a 
long and arduous probation. Those who succeeded in gaining ad-
mission would work selflessly for the well-being of the whole 
Soviet people. Those members who failed to live up to their party 
obligations would be ruthlessly purged from the party ranks. 
A time would come when the work of socialist construction 
would be completed and the new society had been organized. Then, 
in the words of Frederick Engels, the strong socialist state would 
«wither away". Such a development, however, lay in the future. It 
was an ideal toward which Soviet society might look forward. For 
the present the state was a powerful instrument, vigilantly safe-
guarding the interests of Soviet citizens. 
Such were the general objectives of Soviet policy. They will be 
found in the writings and speeches of Lenin and his co-workers. 
They took form in the discussions and resolutions of the Russian 
Communist Party. Attempts were made to give them institutional 
reality in the developing life of the new society. 
Counter-revolutionary forces and the inertia inherent in every 
social group rendered the fulfillment of such objectives difficult or 
impossible. In the economic field, for example, one of the first 
moves of the Soviet Government was to socialize the means of 
production and to establish a wide range of economic social serv-
ices grouped under the general title of war communism. Within 
three years, however, the Soviet Union officially inaugurated a 
New Economic Policy which involved the granting of concessions 
to foreign investors and the restoration of private merchandising 
and some jobbing and manufacturing. Lenin recognized the move 
as a retreat from war communism but described it as a step back-
ward in preparation for two steps forward. Similar changes were 
made in other fields. The high-water mark of the revolution was 
reached in the months and years immediately following November 
1917. Thereafter adjustments and compromises were made with 
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the counter-revolutionary forces both inside and outside the Soviet 
Union. A temporary advance was registered in the collectivization 
of farmland that accompanied the first Five Year Plan (1928). 
For the most part, however, the years from 192 I to 1941 witnessed 
the adaptation of Soviet institutions to the psychology of a popu-
lation trained under Tzarism and to a world scene in which the 
Soviet Union and its institutions were anathema to virtually every 
ruling class group. 
So much for the internal life of the Soviet Union. Equally im-
portant in the eyes of Soviet leaders and of great numbers of 
Soviet workers was the relation between the Soviet Union and the 
outside world. The Russian Revolution was but one expression of 
a general revolutionary wave. If the Russian workers could over-
throw their exploiters and set up a socialist republic, why could 
not the workers in Germany, France, Great Britain, the United 
States, Mexico, China and Japan do the same thing? The achieve-
ment of this world revolution would be followed by the establish-
ment of a world federation of peoples' republics. Empires would 
be a thing Qf the past. Wars v/ould cease. The peoples Qf the 
world, united in Qne great commonwealth, WQuid live in peace and 
friendship. The age-Qld cQnflict Qf man against man WQuid be 
forgotten in the period of universal brotherhQod. 
The WQrld revolution did not materialize, however. By 1922, 
when the Fascists seized PQwer in Italy, it was evident that world 
cQunter-revQlutiQn was far more likely than world revolution. 
Hence the gradual adaptatiQn Qf SQviet diplomacy and SQviet fQr-
eign policy to' a world directed by the principles Qf power politics 
and dQminated by half-a-dozen well-armed empires. 
More than a quarter of a century has passed since the Soviet 
Union adQpted its ambitious prQgram fQr a socialized Russia and 
a sQcialized, federated WQrld. What remains Qf these plans? In the 
world at large, Qutside Qf SQviet China, little Qr nothing, except 
insofar as the existing anti -SQviet sQcial Qrder has taken Qver 
segments Qf Soviet thinking and QrganizatiQn. Social planning is 
now generally accepted as a functiQn Qf government. Managed 
. eCQnomies are taken fQr granted. The WQrld at large, however, is 
still either nQn-socialist Qr anti-socialist. 
Inside the Soviet UniQn, while the mortality Qf early Soviet in-
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stitutions has been comparatively high, and while modifications in 
Soviet thinking have been numerous and profound, Soviet society 
has retained a phenomenally large proportion of the innovations 
which it inaugurated immediately after the revolution. Social own-
ership of the means of production has been retained and enlarged 
as the basis of Soviet economy. Social planning has been carried 
to a high state of proficiency. Racial minorities have been federated, 
their position has been respected, and despite their long tradition 
of friction and conflict under Tzarism, they have worked together 
with remarkable effectiveness. The one-party state has continued. 
Control within the party has been more highly centralized. The 
local autonomy of members of the Soviet Federation has been 
decreased. Opposition was liquidated in the drastic purges of 
1936-38. Nevertheless, the test imposed by the Nazi invasion of 
1941 showed the Russian people solidly behind their leadership. 
Soviet foreign policy, as we shall see in the course of these 
discussions, no longer anticipates world revolution as an imme-
diate probability. On the contrary, Soviet diplomats recognize 
their position as a socialist minoritr in an imperialist world. 
When Eric Johnston, President of. the United States Chamber of 
Commerce, returned from an extensive inspection trip of Russia 
in the summer of 1944, he wrote a series of signed newspaper 
articles summing up his observations. ttThe Soviet's life is based 
upon the State's ownership of all the means of production .... 
There is absolutely no evidence that the Soviet Union intends to 
abandon, even in the smallest degree, this principle of the State's 
ownership of all .the means of production. In fact, the people's 
devotion to this system has been strengthened by the successes of 
war .... The older, top-ranking Communist leaders installed this 
system of collectivism twenty-seven year ago. They believed it saved 
Russia from German enslavement. These older leaders are not 
going to change the system. The directors of factories and farms 
are men in their thirties. They know no other system for com-
parison ... : Today, not even telescopic or X-ray vision could see 
any private enterprise clothing in the Russian Bear's wardrobe." 
(N, Y. Times, July 30, 1944.) 
Granted the correctness of Mr. Johnston's contention, and in the 
article he goes on to 'argue that the Russian rank and file support 
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their leaders in this position, it is evident that the revolution has 
brought benefits that make it appear superior to Tzarism. What 
are some of those benefits? 
1. A people, living in the dark, has been enlightened. An il-
literate famine-ridden exploited community, saturated with super-
stition, has been replaced by a literate, scientifically-minded gen-
eration, convinced that it can playa major role in shaping its own 
destiny and in modifying the destiny of the entire human race. 
2. A technically backward cOlnmunity has been converted, with-
in one generation, into one of the most technically advanced areas 
in the world. This transformation has been effected as a result of 
social plans which the masses helped to make and to carry out. 
The collectivization and mechanization of agriculture is one of the 
most important aspects of this technological revolution. 
3. A widely-Bung nation, consisting largely of farmers scattered 
in some three hundred thousand villages and enjoying few social 
services beyond those grudgingly rendered by a poorly served ec-
clesiastical apparatus, has come into possession of an elaborate 
social security and social service organization including public 
health, public education, public recreation, multiple social insur-
ance, electrification, postal service, roads. 
4. Industrialization, technical improvements, the broadening of 
scientific activity, the encouragement of the arts and the growth 
of the social services have created an unprecedented demand for 
trained personnel. Consequently, within a decade after the revolu-
tion the Soviet Union was turning out tens of thousands of trained 
men and women who were learning and following a wide variety 
of technical and professional careers. In the language of the capital-
ist world, the revolution greatly expanded the Russian middle 
class. In Soviet language, the revolution created a mass technologi-
cal intelligentsia. 
5. Socialistic construction offered energetic, ambitious boys and 
girls of the new generation an opportunity to make a career for 
themselves in the professions of their choice. Youth responded, as 
young people anywhere respond under similar circumstances, 
crowding into the schools, activating organizations, pouring time, 
energy and enthusiasm into the multi pIe channels opened to them 
by the revolution. Eric Johnston noted that the managers of Soviet 
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enterprises are generally in their thirties. They are men and 
women born around 1910, trained during or since the revolution, 
who today compose the immense staff of technical experts that 
directs the Soviet social apparatus. 
6. Soviet youth has not worked for Russia alone. It has been 
trained to believe that socialist construction gains in the Soviet 
Union are gains for mankind. Events have demonstrated the cor-
rectness of this view. Successes achieved in many branches of 
Soviet endeavor have made the Soviet Union a pioneer and leader 
in world cultural advance .. The Soviet Union is pioneering on the 
social frontier and its achievements have already modified human 
society. Individually and collectively the Soviet people have a 
record of which they may be justly proud and look forward into 
a future which they are actively helping to shape. 
7. Tzarism confined opportunity to a relatively small group at 
the apex of the social pyramid. In accordance with feudal tradi-
tion, the top leaders were generally born to authority, whether 
they were capable of exercising it or not. The revolution opened 
the gates of opportunity to the masses, and through them Hooded 
a great wave of popular enthusiasm to know, to plan, to build 
and create. 
There was a type pattern of social organization existing 
throughout the western world in the 19th century. We have been 
calling it the Victorian pattern. It included such traditional insti-
tutions as private property, class division, capitalist exploitation, 
parliamentary government, imperialism and military conHict. 
During the past fifty years .the Victorian pattern has been pulver-
ized as -the result of economic breakdown, war, colonial revolt 
and social revolution. Discovery and invention have played a 
basic part in expediting this process. Out of the disorder and 
chaos attendant upon the destruction of the old social order, a 
new social form is emerging. The Russian Revolution was the 
dramatic highlight in ·this social change and the Soviet Union has 
become the pioneer of the new social order. 
Through the 18th century, when feudal society was being re-
placed by a business-dominated world, the English colonies in 
North America, the business elements in France and the ruling 
classes of Britain and Holland built up the system of free enter-
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prise in economics and of representative parliamentary government 
in politics which became the type pattern of the more progressive 
parts of the 19th century world. There seems every reason to be-
lieve that the institutional changes that followed the Russian Revo-
lution may be playing a similar part in establishing the social type 
pattern of the 20th century. 
The Soviet Union is a large, complex and rapidly changing 
community, about which it is difficult to generalize with any degree 
of accuracy. I have tried to describe some of the changes that have 
taken place since Tzarism was replaced by Sovietism and to indicate 
the effects that these changes have had upon the life of the 
Russian people. This analysis is of necessity superficial, inadequate 
and sadly lacking in the kind of detail necessary to any complete 
picture. But it helps to clothe the term ttSoviet Union" with a 
reality that lies beyond the realm of prejudice and that is making 
it possible for the peoples of Russia to playa major role in world 
affairs. 
II. THE 5 0 V lET U N ION 
BECON\ES A WORLD POWER 
Tzarist Russia was a world power. There could be no two opin-
ions on that subject. The country had a large area and a consider-
able population. Foreign governments sent ambassadors to the 
Court of St. Petersburg. Russian diplomats were sought out and 
consulted. The Russian Foreign Office was one of the busiest in 
Europe. Textbooks listed Russia among the seven or eight leading 
powers. 
With the fall of the Tzar went the prestige that had attached to 
the Russian Court and had attended the representatives of the 
Russian state. The Tzar was dead, the Court was dissolved. Those 
who had spoken for Russia in the name of His Imperial Majesty 
were scattered far and wide. The guiding spirits in the Bolshevik 
state had been gathered from the prison camps of Siberia, the jails 
of Russia, and from humble living quarters in foreign cities. They 
spoke in the name of wage-earners, farmers, soldiers and profes-
sional workers. Could a state led by such a motley collection of 
nobodies become a great world power? 
Before a specific answer can be given to that question it will be 
necessary to come to some understanding as to the meaning of 
political power. We speak of The Powers, with a capital P, and 
refer to a particular nation or empire as a Great Power or a World 
Power. What do these terms imply? 
Until comparatively recent years it was customary to describe 
power rather than to define it. There was no question in anyone's 
mind but that Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia were all 
great powers before 1917. Why were they great powers? Psychol-
ogists, analysing power in human relationships, describe it as the 
possibility of imposing the will of one person upon another person. 
Sociologists define power as the possibility of compelling others 
to subordinate their interests to the interests of those in authority. 
The man in the street would say that power implies the possibility 
of pushing somebody else around. Translate these ideas into the 
realm of international politics and power signifies the capacity of 
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the power-holder to impose its will upon those nations, peoples or 
individuals over whom it desires to exercise authority. 
Political scientists are pretty well agreed as to the practical 
meaning of power. Frederick L. Schuman, for example, begins his 
International Politics: ttForce, fraud and favors are the weapons 
of power which rulers have used from the beginning of recorded 
time to induce obedience from the ruled." (2nd Ed., p. I.) N. J. 
Spykman explains international power relations by pointing out 
that international society, as at present constituted, is ttwithout a 
central authority to preserve law and order, and without an official 
agency to protect its members in the enj oyment of their rights." 
(America's Strategy in World Politics, p. 7') * Consequently, ttthe 
basic objective of the foreign policy of all states is the preservation 
of territorial integrity and political independence." (Ibid.) p. 17.) 
Under such circumstances, ttThe struggle for power is identical 
with the struggle for survival, and the improvement of the relative 
power position becomes the primary objective of the internal and 
the external policy of states .... Power means survival, the ability 
to impose one's will on others, the capacity to dictate to those who 
are without power .... The search for power is not made for the 
achievement of moral values. Moral values are used to facilitate 
the attainment of power." (Ibid.) p. 18.) What is the ultimate 
test of power? Professor Spykman answers: t tPower is, in the last 
instance, the ability to wage successful war." (Ibid.) p. 4I.) 
Such definitions make world politics and power politics synony-
mous terms. In the absence of world government, sovereign states 
in the pursuit of their special interests take whatever steps are 
necessary to ensure their survival and to extend their control over 
additional territory and larger numbers of people. ttpolitics has 
ever been a game wherein the contestants have vied with one an-
other for the tools of authority." (Schuman, as above, p. I.) What 
are the tools of authority? What are the elements of world power? 
For the purpose of our discussion we shall list six factors and 
describe them as the essential ingredients of political power: (I) 
geographical advantage; (2) productivity; (3) man power; (4) 
leadership, management and direction; (5) a military apparatus, 
* Quotations by permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 
publishers. 
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and (6) the unity, solidarity and morale of the community. Any 
nation or people in possession of these six power ingredients is a 
world power, irrespective of historic background or contemporary 
world opinion. 
If historic background or contemporary world opinion were the 
determining factor in world power, Tzarist Russia still would be 
classed as a world power. If world-wide disapproval, opposition, 
hatred and ostracism were determining factors in preventing a 
nation or people from becoming a world power, the Soviet Union 
could never have hoped for inclusion among the leading nations. 
In short, world power is a question not of prejudice or opinion 
but of fact. In examining the position of the Soviet Union as a 
world power, neither opinion nor prejudice play any significant 
role. Either the Soviet Union possesses the essential ingredients of 
power and must therefore be included in any consideration of 
world powers, or else, lacking these ingredients it must be content 
to rank among the minor factors in international affairs. 
Geographically the Soviet Union occupies an unusually advan-
tageous position. Its territory stretches from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific, occupying contiguous portions of northern Europe and 
northern Asia. During the last five centuries all of the great world 
powers have been located in the North Temperate Zone. There 
is some difference of opinion as to the reason, but one geographical 
factor is obvious, the bulk of the world land masses lies in the 
North Temperate Zone, and the bulk of the world's population 
lives there. Any nation occupying eight million square miles of 
contiguous territory in the North Temperate Zone would be in a 
strategically desirable power position. 
Before the development of electricity as a source of light and 
industrial energy, Russia lay rather far to the north. Winters were 
severe; days were shorter, and the possibilities of production and 
transport were sharply limited by the seasons. One of the first 
measures taken by the Bolshevik Government called for the estab-
lishment of an electric grid covering the entire Soviet Union. Even 
during the war years, construction on this grid has continued. 
Soviet territory lies so far to the north that the problem of ice-
free ports is a matter of major importance. Russian foreign policy 
long has been colored by the necessity for warm-water outlets. 
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The problem remains, but with the growth of railroading, road-
trucking and aviation it has become less essential than it was in 
the days when most transportation and travel were water-borne. 
European national territories were carved out for the most part 
in an era of sailing ships and horse-drawn land traffic. These fac-
tors explain at least in part the relatively equal areas of the prin-
cipal west European nations. The continental dimensions of the 
Soviet Union rendered efficient administration difficult or impos-
sible before the introduction of rail, auto and air transport, tele-
phone, telegraph and radio. Since these technical advances were 
made, continental areas like those included in the U.S.A. and the 
U.S.S.R. can be administered more easily from one central point 
than could the much smaller nations of West Europe be adminis-
tered in the middle of the last century. 
Fertility is no less important than the location and extent of a ge-
ographic area. The term includes soil productivity, timber growth 
and the presence of metals and fuels. In all of these respects the 
Soviet Union is unusually fortunate. Some of the most productive 
land in the world is included within its borders. In climatic range 
the country extends from the Arctic to the sub-tropics. The Soviet 
Union contains the largest timber reserves of any country in the 
world. The quantity and variety of its metals and fuels have not 
yet been determined, but the geological surveys undertaken and 
the mining enterprises launched during the last two decades make 
it certain that, with the possible exception of the United States, 
no nation has within its hDme territory a greater quantity Dr 
variety Df the metals or fuels essential to' modern industry. 
One considerable school of thought has, in recent years, laid 
great stress upon the role Df geography as an ingredient of power. 
The argument may have been somewhat overdrawn by the geo-
political school, but there can be no difference of Dpinion about 
the assertion that geographical factors are of great consequence 
as power determinants. In terms of geography the Soviet Union 
occupies a position that has no parallel outside of North America. 
If China or western Europe were unified, politically and socially, 
they would have to be included in this listing of advantageous 
ge~graphic positions. As matters stand today, however U.S.A. and 
LJ S.S.R. hold the two choicest geographic bases for political power. 
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The second ingredient of political power is productivity. Fertile 
soil and mineral deposits are ineffective in power terms unless 
they can be converted intO' producer and consumer goods. It is a 
truism that North America, under the Red Men, was less pro-
ductive than under the White Men. The difference was not in 
fertility but in utilization. 
Under the Tzars, Russian fertility was only partially utilized. 
Much of its mineral wealth was not even suspected. Quantities of 
timber and farm products were exchanged in the raw for manu-
factured imports. The Soviet regime has multiplied Russian 
productivity by greatly extending the utilization of its natural 
resources, improving its agricultural technique and building an 
extensive industrial plant. 
Soviet economy has passed through fO'ur notable stages. The 
first, extending from 1917 to 1922, included the period of the 
revolution and the civil wars which followed it. Soviet produc-
tivity in 1922 was probably about one-fifth that of 1913. In 
certain fields, such as railroading and mining, production was 
virtually at a standstill. The second stage was one of recovery, 
lasting O'ver five years. In 1927 the level of productivity in the 
Soviet Union was roughly that of Tzarist Russia in 1913. The 
third period of Soviet economy covered a decade, from the inau-
guration of the First Five Year Plan in 1928 to the Munich Con-
ference ten years later. The fourth period was a period of YVar 
economy that began in 1939, when Soviet leadership definitely 
was preparing for participation in World War II. 
Soviet authorities have compiled figures of national income 
which express this development in the following form: 
RUSSIAN NATIONAL INCOME 
IN 1926-7 PRICES 
(in billions of rubles) 
1913................................................................................. 21.0 
1925................................................................................. 16.8 
1929................................................................................. 28.9 
1938................................................................................. 105.0 
The second year of the Five Year Plan found Soviet income 
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well above that of Tzarist pre-war Russia. During the next ten 
years the national income increased more than three-fold. 
Soviet income inceased rapidly after 1928 because that year 
witnessed the beginning of planned production. Various tentative 
plans had been tried out during the previous decade. Most of 
them were limited to particular economic fields, such as electrifi-
cation, and all of them were tentative gropings after a technique 
that would permit the coordination of an entire national economy. 
The First Five Year Plan paralleled the collectivization of agri-
culture. After its inauguration the whole of Soviet economy 
moved ahead under the direction of local, regional and central 
planning authorities. The League of Nations Statistical Year 
Book publishes a table of index numbers covering general indus-
trial production, and arranged by countries. The figures are based 
upon 1929 as 100 and cover exactly a decade. They were so sig-
nificant that I should like to refer to them in some detail. 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX 
Germany Great Britain U.S.A. Soviet Union 
1929 ........................ 100 100 100 100 
1932 ........................ 53 84 54 183 
1935 ........................ 94 106 76 293 
1938 ........................ 126 116 72 470 
Comparable figures are given for four countries in order to empha-
size the contrast between Soviet economic trends and the trends 
in countries that were still relying upon unplanned economy. 
Perhaps it is merely a coincidence, but the Soviet Five Year Plan 
was launched in the height of bourgeois prosperity in the 1920s. 
Years before, Lenin had raised the question: who will outdistance 
whom? Bourgeois economy had sought stabilization in terms of 
its pre-war status. Soviet economy represented the achievements of 
socialist construction based upon an over-all social plan. Indus-
trial production in Germany, Great Britain and the United States 
passed from a high point in 1929 to a low one in 1932. There-
after, it advanced in Germany and Great Britain with the matur-
ing armaments race. Arms production did not make its influence 
felt in United States economy until 1939. 
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Two facts regarding Soviet economy are particularly noteworthy 
in the above table. First, Soviet productivity increased every year 
from 1929 to 1938. In other words, Soviet production, unlike 
that of every other industrialized area was not affected by the world-
wide depression. The second noteworthy fact is the rapidity with 
which Soviet economy developed. The League Year Book breaks 
down the production figures for the leading nations into consumer 
goods, producer goods and machinery. From 1929 to 1936 con-
sumer goods production in the Soviet Union rose 1"86%; producer 
goods, 386%; machine production, 826%. Unfortunately for this 
comparison, Soviet figures for 1937 and 1938 were not available 
when the League publication went to print. 
The First Five Year Plan was launched with the avowed inten-
tion of converting the Soviet Union from a country depending upon 
imports of manufactured goods to a country manufacturing for 
its domestic market. . In order to achieve this result it was necessary 
to construct machines, open mines, build factories, expand road 
and railroad facilities. The success of this program between 1928 
and 1936 is indicated by the figures just cited. 
When the Soviet government was established, Russia was a 
predominantly agricultural country. Although some industries had 
been developed, Tzarist Russia did not rank as a producer of manu-
factured goods. Under the drive of socialist construction the 
Soviet Union became one of the three or four most important 
manufacturing centres in the world. Pig iron is the principal metal 
of modern industry. World production stood at 99 million tons in 
1929; at 49 million tons in 1933; and at 104 million tons in 
1937. Soviet production of pig iron for the same three years was 
4 million tons; 7 million tons, and 17 million tons. Coal is the 
principal fuel of modern industry. World production was 1,333 
million tons in 1929; 1,008 million tons in 1933, and 1,307 mil-
lion tons in 1937. Soviet production of coal for the same three years 
was 42 million tons; 76 million tons; 123 million tons. While 
world iron and coal production dipped through the depression 
and reached pre-depression levels by 1937, Soviet iron and coal 
production multiplied three times. The Soviet Union was moving 
with giant strides in its efforts to overtake and surpass industrial 
production in the capitalist world. 
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Iron and coal were major factors in 19th century industry, and 
they are major factors today. The use of electricity, on the other 
hand, is a relatively modern industrial development. It is note-
worthy that in 1938, the last year before the outbreak of World 
War II, the production of electric energy in millions of kilowatt 
hours was: U.S.A. 116,890; Germany 55,238; U.S.S.R. 38,000 
The fourth country in terms of electric production was Great 
Britain, with 30,700. In 1929, Canada, Japan, France, and Italy 
all exceeded the Soviet Union in the production of electricity. 
Soviet production was more than six times as great in 1938 as it 
was in 1929, making the Soviet Union the third largest producer 
in the world. 
When the Soviet leaders took over the broken remnants of Tza-
rist society they faced two major tasks. One was to get Russia back 
to the productive levels of 1913. The other was to industrialize 
the Soviet Union. The former task was completed by 1927. Ten 
years later the Soviet Union occupied a position among the three 
or four most important industrial producing nations of the world. 
The third factor which we listed as among the six essential 
ingredients of political power, was man power. No state apparatus 
can function unless it has an adequate supply of men and women 
trained and willing to carry on the necessary social activities. The 
great powers of Europe, outside Russia, have populations running 
from 42 million in France, 43 million in Italy, 47 million in Great 
Britain to 65 million in Germany. The population of Japan is 72 
million; of the United States 130 million. The population of the 
Soviet Union is 170 million. All of these figures are for 1937 and 
1938. Among the great powers of the world the Soviet Union 
ranks first in the numbers of its home population. Quantity without 
quality is meaningless, however, and in terms of political power, 
quality means capacity to produce, organize, administer, defend. 
Tzarist Russia had a large population, but the bulk of them were 
farmers who depended upon human energy and a little animal 
power. Four-fifths of these farmers could neither read nor write. 
One of the first tasks confronted by Soviet leaders was that of 
developing a trained personnel. Something has already been said 
in our discussion of the Russian Revolution concerning the revo-
lution in Russian education that accompanied the shift in political 
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power. Under the Tzars, about seven million children were in 
school. Twenty years later, the total was about 33 million. If time 
permitted, a great deal might be said about the course of study 
under the two regimes. Tzarist schools were mainly church con-
trolled. They deliberately avoided technical education. Soviet 
schools were organized to turn out a group of boys and girls capable 
of carrying on the necessary work of a modern industrial community. 
The Soviet Union did not limit its educational endeavors to 
youngsters. It carried through a remarkably successful campaign 
to teach the whole adult population reading and writing. Twenty 
years after the revolution, when some 30 million children were 
enrolled in classes, the number of adults similarly enrolled was 
placed at 50 millions. Unfortunately, there is no time to pursue 
this subject further. It may be summed up in a sentence: the Soviet 
Union undertook the task of educating and retraining an entire 
population. Its success is measure a at least in part by the remarkable 
strides made in the various departments of Soviet life. 
Fourth among the essential ingredients of political power we 
listed leadership, management, and direction. Tzarism broke down 
because its leadership was unable to direct public affairs under the 
stress of total war. Soviet leadership faced the tasks of the revolu-
tion, of the liquidation of the old regime, of the rehabilitation of 
a disorganized society, and of the planning and construction of a 
socialist community. In all of these directions it successfully met 
the three tests of leadership: (I) it was able to survive; (2) it 
was able to command community support; (3) it was able to meet 
a changing social scene and to adapt itself to new social situations 
as they arose. 
There are periods in history when leadership survival depends 
upon ability to defend and preserve the status quo, but a high 
tempo of social change requires of leadership adaptability rather 
than capacity to conserve. From I9I7 to I927 Soviet leadership 
faced revolutionary change. During the next decade its primary 
task was that of adjusting itself to survival in an imperialist world. 
Soviet leadership during the first period was in the main revolu-
tionary; during the second period it fell back upon compromise 
and formulas of political expediency. The leadership mortality 
involved in this changing outlook was relatively high but the 
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Soviet people proved themselves equal to the task of providing a 
leader group for each of these sharply divergent tasks. 
Munich presented Soviet leadership with a third problem: 
preparation for total war. Again there were replacements. Again 
Soviet leadership proved itself capable of waging total war and 
of surviving. 
Survival in total war, which is the final test of political power, 
depends upon the effectiveness of the war-making apparatus. It is 
obviously impossible to give facts and figures concerning Soviet 
military prep~rations. This much is known, however. Between 
I94I and I945 the armed forces of the Soviet Union met and 
mastered a military organization that by common consent was one 
of the best organized and equipped. Furthermore, behind Nazi 
militarism in I94I was the productive capacity not only of a highly 
industrialized Germany, but in addition, of Austrian, Czech, Bel-
gian, French, Polish, Dutch and other industrialized European 
territories. Ten years earlier it would probably have been impos-
sible for the Soviet Union to meet such an onslaught. The crucial 
years following the inauguration of the First Five Year Plan pro-
vided the country with the machine equipment needed to supply 
its armed forces and to maintain the working capacity of its civilian 
population. 
Finally, among the essential ingredients of political power, is 
the unity, solidarity and stamina of a nation or people. Russia 
had never been a highly coordinated empire. On the contrary, 
regional and racial tensions and conflicts were accentuated and 
utilized by the Tzarist burocracy in accordance with the widely 
adopted formula: divide and rule. The years immediately after 
the Russian Revolution witnessed an ambitious effort to weld to-
gether into a working organization the heterogenous economic, 
racial, nationalistic, linguistic and religious elements that had lived 
in uneasy propinquity under Tzarism. The problem of making this 
adjustment was referred to in terms of racial and national minori-
ties. Something has already been said about the success attending 
two decades of Soviet minorities policy. It was common talk in the 
imperial capitals that an invasion of Russia would split the country 
wide open, with Ukrainians, White Russians and other suppressed 
nationalities taking the opportunity to strike back at their Great 
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Russian oppressors. The German General Staff undoubtedly based 
its strategy upon such a pre-supposition. No such divisions occurred. 
Instead, the Soviet people displayed so phenomenal a sense of 
solidarity that, under the pressure of military defeat and even of 
military occupation, there were few defections. The invaders were 
able to secure as collaborationists no Russian leaders of conse-
quence. The Moscow regime commanded the almost unanimous 
support of the Soviet population. 
Such a test of national solidarity comes rarely-perhaps once 
in a generation. The Soviet Union met the test and survived it more 
successfully perhaps than any other invaded nation of Europe. 
We have examined the six essential ingredients of political 
power,-geographical advantage, productivity, man power, leader-
ship and direction, military effectiveness, and group solidarity,-as 
they are represented in the life of the Soviet Union. If these are 
the essentials of world power, then certainly the Soviet Union is 
a world power, because in these essential respects the Soviet Union 
stands well at the forefront among modern nations. In theory at 
least, and in the terms ordinarily employed by the student of 
politics, the Soviet Union occupies a prominent position in the top 
power group. 
So much for our theoretical analysis. Now let us turn our atten-
tion to matters of power politics. Power politicians do not bargain 
and threaten in terms of theory. They recognize and respect 
strength as readily as they take advantage of weakness. 
Revolution weakens the power position of any community in 
which it occurs. For one thing, revolution involves a change in 
leadership. Again, it means institutional transformations. Any such 
rapid alternations in the social set-up lead not only to confusion 
but invite disruption of which the counter-revolutionary forces are 
the first to take advantage. The Russian Revolution proved no ex-
ception to this rule of history. Changes of leadership, institutional 
shifts, and counter-revolutionary drives were so effective in weak-
ening the Soviet State that the Germans had no difficulty in impos-
ing a victor's peace at Brest-Litovsk and the Poles and Roumanians, 
with the backing of the western empires, were able to deprive the 
Soviet Union of vital territory. Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lith-
uania, all parts of the Tzarist empire, became independent nations 
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and, with Poland and Czechoslovakia, constituted the cordon sani-
taire that separated western Europe from the ((Bolshevik Menace" . 
Thus, in the first four years of its existence, the Soviet State not 
only suffered military defeat, but was forced to surrender territory 
that had been a part of the Tzarist empire. 
With the exception of protests from labor bodies like the British 
Trade Union Congress these attacks against the Soviet Union were 
carried on with impunity. Soviet Russia was an outcast nation. It 
was I924 before Great Britain recognized the Soviet regime. 
France, Italy and Japan followed suit. Sixteen years passed before 
the United States recognized the U.S.S.R. As lately as the Munich 
encirclement of I938 it was taken for granted that a coalition of the 
great powers could liquidate the Soviet Union as they had disposed 
of the Spanish and Czech Republics during the two preceding 
years. Count Ciano records in his diary a remark of the German 
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop on June I6, I94I: ttIf we attack them, 
the Russia of Stalin will be erased within eight weeks." (N. Y. 
Times 6/I8/45) 
From I922 to "I94I the Soviet Union tested out its economic and 
social attitudes, relationships and institutions. Rapid and drastic 
modifications were made in many directions. Particularly after the 
launching of the Firsf Five Year Plan, Soviet leadership, sure of 
its course, began large-scale industrialization as a preliminary to 
making the country relatively independent of the capitalist world. 
Speaking in Moscow before a meeting to celebrate the October 
Revolution, V. M. Molotov said: ttThe capitalist world has recently 
been obliged to yield a little and retreat, while the Soviet Union ... 
has grown in dimensions and increased its population ... We must 
not forget, of course, that nine-tenths of the human race are still 
living within the framework of capitalist society, under the rule 
of capitalism. . 
"The Soviet Union comprises less than one-tenth of the popula-
tion of the globe ... Comparison between the paths of development 
of the capitalist countries and of the Soviet Union speak against 
the capitalist world and not for it." (Text of TASS dispatch N. Y. 
Times I2/7/39) 
It was at this time that Molotov and other Soviet spokesmen 
began to refer to the Soviet Union as eta great world power". The 
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reference was not taken seriously, however, in the imperialist capi-
tals. So relatively unimportant did the Soviet Union seem as a 
factor in world politics that when Prime Minister Churchill and 
President Roosevelt held their Atlantic Conference in August 
1941 the Soviet Union was ignore.d. The Anglo-American leaders 
decided, in effect, that they would organize and police the post-
war world, and in proof of their intentions they signed and pub-
lished the Atlantic Charter, setting forth in idealistic language an 
Anglo-American formula for Anglo-American world domination. 
Not only was the Soviet Union ignored, but Anglo-Saxon publi-
cists accepted the Atlantic Charter as the consummation of a long 
postponed unification of world-supreme forces. In the past, Bri-
tannia alone had ruled the waves. Combined with American pro-
ductive capacity it seemed obvious that British sea-supremacy 
would be able to direct world affairs. 
After the publication of the Atlantic Charter, people talked 
constantly about Anglo-American world policing. When I asked 
them: <tDo you propose also to police the Soviet Union?" the 
almost invariable answer was: <tOf course. Why not?" 
The Soviet Union had been invaded on JU:le 22, 1941 by Ger-
man armed forces. In August therefore when the Atlantic Con-
ference was held, the Soviet Union was at war as a partner of the 
British Empire. Had the Soviet Union been taken seriously it 
would certainly have been invited to participate in the Conference 
discussions. Although the United States did not enter World War 
II until four months after the Atlantic Conference, it was the 
United States and not the Soviet Union that joined with the Brit-
ish to make up the Big Two that drevv up the Atlantic Charter. 
Soviet forces were engaging the great bulk of the Axis war 
machine. Negotiations were already under way that resulted in 
the Anglo-Soviet Twenty Year Treaty of May 1942. The Soviet 
Union was not included because both London and Washington 
were convinced that it could be ignored safely. Only the strong 
were invited to conferences of big powers. 
During the next two years the Soviet Union suffered a series 
of military reverses, lost large areas of its most productive terri-
tory, and came within a hair's breadth of losing both Leningrad 
and Moscow. The tide turned at Stalingrad. The Red Army had 
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been reorganized and reequipped. The Nazis had extended their 
lines and had struck their blow . Now it was the turn of the 
Red Army. 
A little more than two years after the Atlantic Conference 
Marshal' Jan Smuts made a speech before the United Kingdom 
Branch of the Empire Parliamentary Association in the Houses of 
Parliament, London, Nov. 25, 1943. (South African Government 
Information Office text.) The speech was historic. General Smuts 
was the first responsible statesman outside the Soviet Union to say 
what Soviet leaders had been repeating since 1938: the Soviet 
Union is a great world power. 
General Smuts offered this analysis of the world situation: c eWe 
have moved into a strange world, a world such as has not been 
seen for hundreds of years, perhaps not for a thousand years. 
Europe is completely changing. The old Europe which we have 
known ... has gone. The map is being rolled up and a new map 
is unrolling before us." General Smuts followed this statement 
with a brief comment on the disappearance of "three of the five 
great powers" of Europe: Fra.nce, Italy and Germany. "We are, 
therefore, left with Great Britain and with Russia. Russia is the 
new colossus in Europe, the new colossus that bestrides this con-
tinent. When we consider all that has happened to Russia within 
the last twenty-five years, and we see Russia's inexplicable and 
phenomenal rise, we can only call it one of the great phenomena 
in history. It is the sort of thing to which there is no parallel in 
history, but it has come about ... Russia is the new colossus on the 
European continent. What the after-effects of that will be, nobody 
can say. We can but recognize that this is a new fact to reckon 
with, and we must reckon with it coldly and objectively. With the 
others down and out, and herself the mistress of the continent, 
her power will not only be great on that account, but it will be still 
greater because the Japanese Empire will also have gone the way 
of all flesh. Therefore any check or balance that might have arisen 
in the East will have disappeared. You will have Russia in a posi-
tion which no country has ever occupied in the history of Europe." 
General Smuts then turned his attention to Great Britain and 
the British Empire. "The purely European position of Great Bri-
tain will be one of enormous prestige and respect, and will carry 
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enormous weight, but she will be poor." After mentioning (tthe 
United States, the other great world power", General Smuts con-
cluded (tIn that trinity you will have two powers of immense power 
and resources-Russia and America-and you will have this island, 
the heart of the Empire and of the Commonwealth, weak in her 
European resources in comparison with the vast resources of the 
other two." 
While Marshal Smuts was speaking in London, Roosevelt, 
Churchill and Stalin were meeting at Teheran. The brief communi-
cation, dated Dec. I, 1943, apprising the world of the conclusions 
reached at this meeting was signed not by two but three names. 
The Big Three had superseded the Big Two of Atlantic Conference 
days. Little more than two years earlier, Roosevelt and Churchill 
had felt confident that they could decide world issues without 
the presence of a third party. Now the Soviet colossus, bestriding 
the European continent, was included as a matter .of necessity. 
This decision was not reache'd because of personal bias. Church-
ill's writings and speeches for a quarter of a century had marked 
him as an inveterate enemy of Sovietism. Roosevelt's record in the 
Spanish Civil War left no possible doubt as to his attitude. The 
Anglo-American partnership was enlarged because the demon-
strated capacity of the Soviet Union to look out for its own interests 
and to playa prominent role in deciding the affairs of its neighbors 
allowed no margin of choice. 
Churchill and Roosevelt both said many flattering things about 
the achievements of the Red Army in 1942 and 1943. It remained, 
however, for Churchill to hit the nail on the head in his report to 
Commons on August 2, 1944. (tThe Russian Army has done the 
main work in tearing the guts out of the Germany Army". That 
was the decisive factor. After the summer of 1941 more German 
divisions were occupied on the Russian front than on all other 
fields of operation combined. It was there that German resources 
and manpower were most rapidly exhausted. It was there that 
German military might was most effectively liquidated. 
Facts are stubborn things. Nowhere are they more self-evident 
than on the field of battle, which synthesizes and synchronizes all 
of the ingredients of political power. If the capacity to wage suc-
cessful war is the ultimate test of power, the Soviet Union had met 
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and passed the test by the autumn of 1943. Henceforward, it must 
be included as a major factor in world affairs. It became a matter 
of course for a New York Times correspondent (1/9/45) to begin 
a story dealing with the Eastern Mediterranean: t tWith Russia's 
emergence as the greatest power on the European continent, many 
dissident factions in other of the Middle-East countries are looking 
for the first time to Moscow for encouragement in some of their 
hopes." 
The New York Times did not print this sentence because of any 
pro-Soviet leanings. For a generation the paper, both in its editorial 
and news columns had been an outstanding enemy of the Soviet 
Union. It printed the sentence in the opening days of 1945 because 
by that time no responsible European correspondent could ignore 
the immense influence that the Soviet Union was exercising over 
the lesser nations in its vicinity. 
After a·decade of obscurity and impotence growing out of defeat 
in World War I and the revolution with its accompanying civil 
wars, the Bolshevik regime in 1928 launched an over-all plan for -
the building of socialism in one country. Due partly to its geo-
graphic position and partly to its effective development of social 
and political organization, the Soviet Union has been able in the 
past three or four years to meet and pass all of the essential power 
tests. Today it is taken for granted, even among the bitterest re-
actionaries and the most hard-bitten defenders of capitalist im-
perialism, that the Soviet Union is a world power. 
More than three-score nations make up what political scientists 
call the Western State System. Any thorough consideration of the 
part played by the Soviet Union in world affairs would have to 
include some comment on Soviet relations with at least the most 
influential of the world powers. Time forbids any such detailed 
analysis. So we shall group our subject-matter under three main 
headings asking: (I) what are Soviet relations with Europe; (2) 
with Asia, and (3) with the United States. Those considerations 
will lead us to our final topic: the probabilities of peace or war 
for the Soviet Union. 
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III. THE 5 0 V lET U N ION I N E U R 0 P E 
Geographically, the Soviet Union in 1938 occupied about one-
half of Europe. Soviet population was about one-third of the 
European total. Politically, as Marshal Smuts so very well said, the 
Soviet Union has a position in Europe which no nation has held 
in modern times. So much for the general picture. In considering 
some of the detail, suppose we begin by noting the phenomenally 
rapid shifts in political partnerships made by the Soviet Union 
during the two decades that preceded 1941. 
These two decades began with a series of European revolutions 
that accompanied and followed W orId War I and reached their 
high point in Russia. The Europe of 1921 was composed of three 
strong victor nations-Britain, France and Italy; of one defeated 
outcast nation-Germany, and of one nation-Russia, emerging 
from revolution and civil war. In addition to these major European 
powers there were a dozen minor powers in Scandinavia, the Low 
Countries, the Iberian Peninsula and South Europe, all of which 
had been in existence prior to 1914, and half-a-dozen synthetic 
minor powers made up at Versailles out of territory formerly held 
by Tzarist Russia, Germany and the dismembered Austro-Hun-
garian Empire. The Europe of 1921 was as unstable as a large 
aggregation of wealth, population and power could well be. The 
stablest part of the continent was in the west. Middle and eastern 
Europe had suffered from political and social major surgery and it 
seemed very doubtful whether the end of the process was yet in 
sight. 
Russia and Germany were the two outcasts in the European 
family of nations. Russia was outcast because its government was 
headed by avowed revolutionists. Germany was outcast because it 
had suffered military defeat, and by official admission had as-
sumed sole guilt for beginning World War I. Representatives of 
these two nations met at Rapallo in 1922 and made a treaty which 
constituted for both Russia and Germany a major diplomatic 
victory. For Russia it meant diplomatic recognition by a first-class 
European power. Germany, though officially guilty of the war, had 
been diplomatically recognized by Russia. 
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The Treaty of Rapallo thus strengthened the position of the two 
weakest major states of Europe. It did something else. In 1922 
Russia was a source of raw materials much needed in Germany. 
Germany possessed a well-equipped industrial plant capable of 
supplying the Soviet Union with the machine tools required for 
socialist construction. Russia was able to offer Germany an op-
portunity to train military cadres on Russian soil. Germany, in 
exchange, provided the Soviet Union with technical aid in estab-
lishing its arms industry. 
There has been much speculation as to the exact nature of the 
Russian-German relationships established at Rapallo, and of the 
effect which they had on the development of the two countries dur-
ing the next fourteen years. It is a fair guess that the diplomatic 
and economic arrangements made at Rapallo were as significant as 
any entered into by the Soviet Union between 1922 and 1936. 
The decade following Rapallo was not a fruitful one in terms of 
Soviet-European relations. Other nations were grudging and slow 
in establishing trade and diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union. Even after the Soviet Union entered the League of Nations, 
in 1934, European governments generally looked askance at Mos-
cow as the possible or probable source of international revolution-
ary agitation that might constitute a serious threat to the established 
system of capitalist imperialism. 
During 1934 and 1935 Soviet diplomats negotiated treaties with 
France and Czechoslovakia. The French treaty was a mutual as-
sistance pact. The Czech treaty provided that the Soviet Union 
would come to the aid of Czechoslovakia if the French did so. 
Both treaties were in theory the beginning of a multilateral mutual 
assistance agreement that might be signed by any European nation 
desiring to do so. The move was a part of the new Soviet diplomacy 
of collective security. It was the answer of the Soviet Foreign 
Office to the growing danger of military encirclement involved in 
the Japanese occupation of Mancburia and in the rise of a fascist-
oriented Middle Europe) The Soviet-French-Czech pacts had an-
other significant aspect. With the Spanish Republic, organized in 
I932, Russia, France and Czechoslovakia stretched across the 
European continent from north-east to south-west. Until the end 
of the German Republic they constituted a continuous belt of pop-
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ular or revolutionary governments, splitting the monarchies of 
north-west Europe away from the monarchies of south-east Europe. 
Two events of I936 had a profound effect upon Soviet rela-
tions with western Europe. The first was the speech made by 
Chancellor Hitler at the Nazi Party Congress in Nuremburg. In the 
cours'e of this address Hitler said that if Germany had the wheat-
fields of the Ukraine and the minerals of the Urals, the German 
people could enjoy great enhancement of their prosperity. The 
second was the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War with its line-up 
of the Soviet Union on the side of the Spanish Republic and of 
Italy, Germany, Britain and France on the side of the rebel generals. 
I938 brought the virtual defeat of the Spanish Republic with 
its consequent discomfiture for the Soviet Union, and the Munich 
Conference engineered by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. 
At this conference Chamberlain representing Britain, Daladier 
representing France, Mussolini speaking for Italy, and Hitler for 
Germany, reached certain agreements with regard to the Czech 
Republic and the Soviet Republic. These agreements are not yet a 
matter of public record. The fate of Czechoslovakia is history. 
The Munich commitments, insofar as they referred to the Soviet 
Union, are still a matter of conjecture. Circumstantial evidence 
however, points strongly to the conclusion that the participants in 
the Munich Conference agreed upon the liquidation of the Soviet 
Republic. Ostensibly, Chamberlain was seeking peace. Actually, he 
succeeded in establishing an alliance of the four major powers of 
western Europe. Two of these powers were members of the Axis 
combination. The Axis group had already signed and published 
the Anti-Comintern Pact (November I936) and were thus pub-
licly lined up in opposition to the Soviet Union. Hitler had openly 
expressed the desire of the Nazis for the Soviet food and metals 
(November I936). All four of the Munich powers had worked 
closely together for two years in the effort to destroy the Spanish 
Republic (I936-38). By implication, Japan, though not repre-
sented at Munich, was a part of the combination made there. 
Japan had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, was in close touch with 
Germany and Italy, and since I93I had been threatening and 
attacking the Soviet Union through Manchuria and Mongolia. 
Munich, in effect, was a five power encirclement of the Soviet 
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Union, directed by the British Prime Minister and designed to 
liquidate the last of those European republics that had come into 
being during the revolutionary decade that followed 1917. Except 
for the United States, every major world power was thus definitely 
aligned against Soviet Russia. 
Munich meant something else beside a four or five power alli-
ance, encircling the Soviet Union. It meant the complete collapse 
of the collective security diplomacy which Litvinov had been cham-
pioning in Geneva. The Soviet Foreign Office had asked for a 
multilateral treaty of mutual assistance that would bind together 
the principal powers of Europe in a policy of collective security 
based on the enforcement of the League of Nations Covenant. The 
answer of western Europe to this Soviet overture was the pact of 
Munich. 
Soviet diplomacy thus found itself defeated. The Soviet Union 
was isolated and encircled. Could it break this iron ring of hostile 
imperial enemies? Or must it accept the gauge of unequal battle 
and fight a war against the vast power of this world-wide political 
combination? The first and obvious step was an attempt to break 
the iron ring. With this obj ect in mind, Soviet representatives 
immediately began negotiations with Britain, France and Germany. 
The negotiations with Britain and France dragged on through the 
spring and early summer of 1939. It seemed evident that the Anglo-
French spokesmen were stalling for time. The negotiations were 
ended when the Soviet Union signed its ten-year non-aggression 
pact with Nazi Germany, August 24, 1939. 
Molot?v, speaking before the All Union Soviet Sept. I, 1939, 
described the episode thus: ttThe decision to conclude a non-ag-
gression pact between the U.S.S.R. and Germany was adopted after 
military negotiations with France and Great Britain had reached 
an impasse ... As the negotiations had shown that the conclusion 
of a pact of mutual assistance could not be expected, we could not 
but explore other possibilities of enduring peace and eliminating 
the danger of war between Germany and U.S.S.R." (Tass text. 
Daily Worker 9/2/39) 
The Soviet-Nazi Pact was unexpected only to those who had not 
followed the course of Soviet diplomacy after Munich. Rumors of 
such a development were published as early as March I939. To the 
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uninitiated, however, the pact was a thunderclap out of a clear sky. 
The Soviet-Nazi Pact marked the end of the Munich Alliance. 
The iron ring had been broken. Soviet diplomacy, for a price, had 
been able to disrupt the Munich combination and thus to guarantee 
itself against an invasion in which all of the major nations of 
Europe would have participated, directly or indirectly. The Nazis, 
on their side, had gained access to the wheat of the Ukraine and the 
metals of the Urals. This source of food and raw materials would 
partly counter-balance the American, African, Asiatic and Aus-
tralasian sources upon which the Anglo-French Allies were draw-
ing. In exchange for food and raw materials the Nazis agreed to 
furnish manufactured goods, including machinery. 
The Soviet-Nazi pact also marked the end of the European armis-
tice and the beginning of World War II. It was immediately fol-
lowed by the German invasion of Poland, the occupation of that 
counry by German and Soviet armies, the treaty of September 29, 
1939, fixing the boundaries between Soviet and German areas in 
Poland, the withdrawal of German nationals from the Baltic states, 
and the ultimate incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
into the Soviet Union. Finland, resisting Soviet overtures regarding 
transfers of property that would have given the Soviet Government 
control of the Mannerheim defence line, was invaded by the Soviet 
Union, and after a costly winter campaign was defeated in 1940. 
The Soviet-Nazi economic agreement was signed Feb. II, 1940. 
A year later the official Tass agency, on behalf of the Soviet Gov-
ernment, issued a statement (Jan. 10, 1941) describing the series 
of Soviet-Nazi agreements made up to that time. The series in-
cluded the ttenlarged economic agreement of January 10, 1941 
under which the U.S.S.R. delivers to Germany industrial raw 
materials, oil products and food-stuffs, especially cereals; Germany 
delivers to the U.S.S.R. industrial equipment." (N. Y. Times 
1/11/41 text) On June 22, 1941 Axis armies invaded the Soviet 
Union. Eleven months later, May 26, 1942, the Soviet Union signed 
its Twenty Year Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain. Thus, with-
in three years, the Soviet Union had been a neutral in the struggle 
between Nazi Germany and the British Empire, an ally of Ger-
many, and an ally of Great Britain. 
The Soviet-Germany treaty of August 1939 had taken the form 
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Df a ten year non-aggressiDn pact. The AnglD-SDviet treaty was 
a twenty year Dffensive and defensive military and eCDnDmic alli-
ance. The parties to. the treaty agreed to take j Dint action against 
aggressiDn; to' render each Dther mutual assistance during W Ddd 
War II; RDt to' cDnclude a separate peace; to. take joint actiDn 
against future agressiDn; to. render each Dther mutual assistance 
in any future war against the Axis pDwers. The parties ctagree to. 
wDrk tDgether in clDse and friendly cDllabDratiDn after the re-
establishment of peace fDr the DrganizatiDn of security and eCD-
nDmic prDsperity in EurDpe." The two. parties further agreed to. 
render Dne anDther all pDssible eCDnDmic assistance after the war 
and (tnDt to cDnclude any alliance and not to. take part in any co-
alitiDn directed against the Dther high cDntracting party." (Great 
Britain. Treaty Series. 1942. No.. 2 Cmd. 6376) '. 
The next three years were almDst equally eventful. The treaty 
with CzechDsIDvakia was signed in December 1943; the treaty 
with France in December 1944. The agreement with the new 
Yugoslav FederatiDn was likewise drawn up in December 1944 
as was the agreement with the PDlish PrDvisiDnal GDvernment. 
During 1945 the SDviet UniDn recDgnized the Warsaw GDvern-
ment, established a prDvisiDnal Austrian gDvernment in Vienna 
and was maintaining friendly gDvernments in Hungary and 
RDumania. 
If SDviet diplDmatic relatiDns between 1921 and 1945 appeared 
like JDseph's cDat of many cDIDrs, the eVDlution Df SDviet pDlicy 
in EurDpe was in reality bDth cDnsistent and cDnsecutive. Further-
mDre, it cDrrespDnded very clDsely with the changing pDwer pDsi-
tiDn Dccupied by the Soviet UniDn during this periDd. 
SDviet Dbjectives in EurDpe might be summarized under four 
headings: (1) peace and security, (2) ' assured in part by the estab-
lishment of strategic frontiers, (3) also. certain natural advan-
tages such as a warm water Dutlet and the cDntrDI Df Dil reserves, 
and finally, (4) a cDDrdinated EurDpe. Such Dbjectives did nDt 
differ materially f rDm thDse Df Tzarist Russia. They cDrresponded 
in substance with the objectives Df other majDr European pDwers. 
They cDuld be realized in prDpDrtion as the Soviet power pDsi-
tiDn improved vis-a-vis the pDwer positiDn of its neighbDrs. 
The SDviet power pDsition altered materially during the two 
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decades following 1921. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty and the Polish 
War cost the Soviet Union territory. It had no prestige to lose. 
League membership restored a measure of respectability and gave 
Soviet representatives an opportunity to make their pleas for 
disarmament and collective security from a rostrum in Geneva, 
Switzerland, but in the big power game of the 1930s the Soviet 
Union was clearly on the defensive. The occupation of Manchuria 
by Japan and of Ethiopia by Italy, the course of the Spanish War 
and the Munich Pact of 1938 could all be interpreted as triumphs 
for the enemies of Sovietism. The Anti -Comintern Axis Pact was 
a public declaration of intent to smash the Soviet Union. The 
Atlantic Charter was formulated without Soviet participation. It 
was not until the successful defense of Stalingrad that the Teheran 
Conference was held and the Big Two was expanded into the Big 
Three. It was only in 1944 that the Red Army succeeded in leav-
ing Russian territory and in occupying portions of Norway, 
Finland, the Baltic states, Roumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, Hungary and Germany. When World War II began, 
thirteen small states, from Finland on the north to Greece on the 
south, separated the Soviet Union from Germany and Italy. By 
the summer of 1945 the Red armies had occupied Berlin and 
Vienna and everyone of these thirteen states, with the exception 
of Greece, had either been incorporated into the Soviet Union or 
had been brought within the Soviet sphere of influence. 
Soviet spokesmen sometimes pretend that their foreign policy 
is unchangeable. The Soviet Information Bulletin, published by 
the Soviet Embassy in Washington, contained an article in the 
November 16, 1944 issue by Colonel A. Galin, listing the six 
basic principals of foreign policy which the Soviet Union has been 
consistently following si!1ce the Bolsheviks secured power: 
1. Peaceful relations with all states irrespective of their politi-
cal systems. 
2. Economic and political cooperation with all states on the 
basis of sovereign equality and independence of the con-
tracting parties and the co-existence of two systems. 
3. Alliances with any state with the purpose of protecting 
both partners from acts of aggression. 
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4. Categorical renunciation of imperialistic expansion at the 
cost of other nations. 
5. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. 
6. Strengthening of the coalition of freedom-loving nations in 
the fight against Fascist aggressors. 
Soviet diplomats may have had some such list of principles in 
mind, but their actual policies were shaped by their power position. 
Immediately after the revolution they tried unsuccessfully to pre-
serve their frontiers against aggression. During the next fifteen 
years their policy was clearly and emphatically defensive. Stalin 
told the I7th Party Congress: HOur foreign policy is clear. It is ~ 
policy of preserving peace and strengthening commercial relations 
with all countries. The U.S.S.R. does not think of threatening any-
body-let alone of attacking anybody . We stand for peace and 
champion the cause of peace. But we are not afraid of threats and 
are prepared to answer the instigators of war blow for blow. 
Those who want peace and are striving after business intercourse 
with us will always receive · our support. And those who try to 
attack our country will receive a stunning rebuff to teach them not 
to shove their hogs' snouts into our Soviet garden again." (Inprecor 
2/I3/34 p. 239) It was I939 before Soviet spokesmen were de-
manding the restoration of Russia's I9I3 frontiers, and Molotov, 
in his radio address of Sept. I7, I939, was saying: HNor can it be 
demanded of the Soviet Government that it remain indifferent to 
the fate of its blood -brothers, the Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians 
in...l}abiting Poland, who even formerly were without rights and 
who now have been abandoned entirely to their fate." (Tass text. 
N. Y. Times 9/I8/39) In the same year Moscow insisted, by the 
use of military force, that the Finnish frontier be. so readjusted 
that the guns on the Mannerheim line were no longer an imme-
diate physical menace to Leningrad. On April 2, I944 Foreign 
·Commissar Molotov received the representatives of the foreign 
press in Moscow and made an official statement on behalf of the 
Soviet Government. The Red Army, he said, is about to enter · 
Roumania, in pursuit of German forces. ccThe Soviet Government 
declares it does not pursue the aim of acquiring Roumanian terri-
tory or of altering the existing social structure of Roumania. The 
entry of Soviet troops into the boundaries of Roumania is dictated 
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exclusively by military necessities." (Official text N. Y. Times 
4/3/44) Seven months. later, Pravda, writing editorially on HThe 
Red Army's Great Mission of Liberation" stated: HIn this war we 
are seeking neither foreign territories, nor power nor prestige. 
Poland and the world know we are going westward for one pur-
pose-to liberate peoples from their enslavers." (N. Y. Ttimes 
11/21/44) ' 
It was a far cry from the days of Soviet weakness, when the 
Red Army was being driven back from Warsaw by the Allied-
supported Polish troops, to the victorious sweep of the Red 
Armies across the Polish plains in their pursuit of retreating 
Nazi forces. In the days of the civil wars Soviet military forces 
were engaged in a desperate and unsuccessful effort to protect 
their frontiers. In 1944-45 the Red armies were occupying the 
whole of central Europe. 
What is a foreign policy? It does not consist of either a decla-
ration or of a set of principles. Rather, it is a series of workable 
alternatives. The Soviet Union is a state attempting to survive 
in a world of rival-and potential enemy-states. Soviet policy 
must therefore be determined by the actions of its potential ene-
mies. If Berlin and London join hands in a Munich Pact, the Soviet 
Government must counter by some move that will successfully 
protect Soviet interests against this threatened combination. If 
London offers Moscow assistance immediately upon the announce-
ment of the Nazi invasion, Moscow must respond with the Anglo-
Russian Twenty Year Treaty as the most available method of 
meeting the Nazi menace. Moscow foreign policy, in other words, 
is made only partly in Moscow. Most Moscow decisions are cond-
tioned by decisions previously made in London, Berlin and 
Tokyo. Furthermore, Moscow's policy must be sufficiently mul-
tiple so that it can be readily adjusted to London and Berlin 
decisions. After Munich, Moscow negotiated with both London 
and Berlin. Since Berlin offered the best terms, Moscow signed 
the Nazi-Soviet Pact. 
Weak nations have their foreign policies made almost exclu-
sively in foreign capitals. They are then classed as satellite states. 
Powerful nations make policy in proportion to their power. This 
fact appears in the decisions taken by the Big Three and accepted 
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by the other members of the United Nations. When the Soviet 
Union was weak it was compelled to adopt policies in terms of 
the relative strength of neighboring capitals. With the Teheran 
Conference in November 1943 the strength of the Soviet Union 
was officially recognized. From that time forward Moscow was 
able to make policy on a parity with London and Washington. 
Moscow did make policy. For example, with regard to the gov-
ernment of Poland. London was supporting a Polish -Government 
in exile. Moscow was supporting a Free Poland Committee. When 
the Red Army occupied Warsaw the Moscow-supported Polish 
Government moved there. Cable appeals from Washington and 
the personal visit of Prime Minister Churchill to Moscow were 
insufficient to alter the Russian determination with regard to the 
Warsaw regime. The struggle was continued during the pre-San 
Francisco conversations in Washington in mid-April 1945 and 
was carried into the San Francisco Conference. The Soviet Union 
was able to maintain its stand because its armies were in Poland 
and it had developed sufficient economic strength to give it a 
good bargaining position. 
Policy in foreign affairs is thus an attribute of power. In our 
discussion of the Soviet Union as a world power, we pointed out 
that between 1941 and 1945 the Soviet military apparatus, backed 
by Soviet production and by the Russian population, had won for 
the Soviet Union a position among the Big Three powers. During 
these same years Soviet foreign policy underwent a change that 
corresponded with its altered power position. Moscow policy was 
no longer dependent in the main upon moves made in London, 
Berlin and Tokyo. Berlin and Tokyo were both out of the run-
ning. London and Washington were watching and wondering 
what Moscow would do next. In short Moscow had secured the , 
diplomatic initiative. 
At -the beginning of this discussion on the role of the Soviet 
Union in Europe we listed the series of alliances and re-alliances 
between Moscow and other European capitals. From 1934 to 1945 
there was a considerable rise in the tempo of these changes. Thus 
far there is no indication of any diminution in this respect, altho 
it seems probable that the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1942 is still the 
keystone of Soviet relations with western Europe. In view of our 
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analysis of the changing Soviet power position and of the nature 
of foreign policy, the past two decades of Soviet-European rela-
tions may be construed in the following manner. Immediately after 
the Russian revolution the Bolsheviks issued flaming proclama-
tions, calling upon the workers of the world to arise and over-
throw their oppressors. This revolutionary offensive was accom-
panied by a notably defensive diplomacy. The middle twenties 
found the Friends of the Soviet Union organized in various bour-
geois capitals as a means of defending Moscow against a potential 
bourgeois assault. Soviet diplomacy was still on the defensive. 
During the Civi1.War in Spain, while the Soviet Union gave active 
support to the Republic, it did so in the name of completing a 
bourgeois revolution. The Latvian Treaty of October 5, 1939, 
Article V, guaranteed the contracting parties against any interfer-
ence with their sovereign rights ttin particular their state o~ganiza­
ion, economic and so~ial systems and military measures". Here 
Bolshevism was on the defensive in revolutionary terms, but the 
Soviet Union was definitely on the diplomatic offensive. The 
Anglo-Soviet Alliance of 1942 found the Soviet Union again on 
the diplomatic defensive. Soviet representatives signed a mutual 
assistance agreement providing for mutual diplomatic support and 
all possible economic assistance after the war. It was not until the 
turn of the war at Stalingrad that the Soviet Union was again able 
to take the diplomatic initiative expressed in its treaty with Czecho-
slovakia (December, 1943), its open and vigorous support for 
Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav Federation (1944), the Soviet-
French Treaty (1944), the recognition of the Lublin Government 
(1944), of the Warsaw Government (1945) and the distribution 
of land to Polish and other peasant inhabitants of the central 
European territories from which the Nazi armies had been expelled. 
The Soviet Union was reaching out, no longer in terms of world 
revolution, but in terms of enlarged frontiers, military occupa-
tion of neighboring non-Russian areas, and the establishment there, 
under Soviet auspices, of Moscow-sponsored friendly governments. 
The situation of 1918-19 was thus completely reversed in 1944-
45. At the earlier date an all-powerful France was sponsoring 
friendly governments in the newly-created states that made up the 
cordon sanitaire between bolshevik East Europe and capitalist 
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West Europe. The cordon sanitaire was established for the deliber-
ate purpose of preventing the spread of bolshevism. The French 
sponsors of these synthetic governments were doing their bit in 
the defense of bourgeois society. At the later date an all-powerful 
Soviet Union was sponsoring friendly governments in the re-created 
states that made up the cordon sanitaire between bolshevik East 
Europe and the remnants of capitalist West Europe. This cordon 
sanitaire was established for the deliberate purpose of enlarging 
bolshevik influence. The bolshevik sponsors of these synthetic gov-
ernments were doing their bit to extend sovietism into an ever-
widening circle of mid-Europe territory. 
During the troubled years that ushered in the present European 
crisis there seemed to be four broad possibilities for the continent: 
I. Continued division into a score of sovereign states under 
the balance of power principle actively supported by Great 
Britain and generally accepted by the ruling classes of the 
European nations. 
2. Coordination under German auspices, first, the imperial 
Germany of the Hohenzollerns; and second, under Nazi 
Germany. 
3. Coordination under Soviet auspices: first, of the world 
revolution; and second, of the victorious Red Army, expell-
ing Nazi military forces and replacing them by Soviet 
armies of occupation. 
4. A united sbttes or free federation of Europe, organized as 
a result of voluntary action among the member states in very 
much the same way that the English colonies in North Amer-
ica formed their federation in 1789. 
Division, and a competitive struggle for power employing 
modern machine weapons, have proved so costly that their con-
tinuance would have involved the obliteration of European cul-
ture. The alternative was some form of unification. Since British 
policy precluded such unification, two possibilities remained, co-
ordination under Germany or under Russian auspices. Twice the 
Germans bid for European leadership and twice they failed, 
because in both cases they were opposed not only by substantial 
European forces but by the joined strength of Great Britain, her 
dominions, the United States and its satellites, working under 
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the general direction of British policy. The first Russian bid for 
European domination along the lines of general revolution was 
met by the united opposition of bourgeois Europe, supported by 
the remainder of the bourgeois world. The second Russian bid for 
the control of Europe took an entirely different form. The Soviet 
Union, functioning as the defender of European culture against 
the menace of Nazi barbarism, was able to align not only the anti-
Nazi forces of the European continent but the full strength of the 
Anglo-American combination. And since in this struggle Red Army 
men did the bulk of the fighting and dying in behalf of the anti-
Nazi cause, they were able to secure agreements at Teheran, Yalta 
or elsewhere, under which the whole of Central Europe, including 
Eastern Germany with its capital, Berlin, fell within the Soviet 
sphere of influence. 
The Soviet Union occupied the eastern half of Europe before 
1939. The capitalist empires occupied the western half, including 
the whole Mediterranean Basin. In terms of natural resources, the 
position of the U.S.S.R. was probably superior. The production 
potential and the population potential, both in terms of volume 
and training, were strongly on the side of the capitalist empires. 
Had the capitalist empires been able to establish and maintain a 
united front as they attempted to do through the League Covenant, 
through the Non-Intervention Committee, and through Munich, 
their combined political strength would have been far greater than 
that of the Soviet Union. Again and again, however, the capitalists 
split amongst themselves. The final division, which came with the 
initiation of World War II, gave the Soviet Union an overwhelm-
ing advantage. Once the Soviet military forces had turned back 
the Nazi invasion it was only a question of time before a united 
Soviet Union would out-point divided western Europe. 
This is the background against which Marshal Smuts, in Novem-
ber 1943, assigned to the Soviet Union its role as the colossus 
bestriding the European continent. This is the background against 
which the Soviet Union took and held the diplomatic initiative in 
support of the Moscow Polish Government as opposed to the 
london Polish Government. This is the background against which 
the Soviet Union has re-established the frontiers of Tzarist Russia 
and is successfully surrounding those frontiers with a broad belt 
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of Soviet-sponsored friendly governments. This is the background 
against which the Soviet Union, in I944, stepped out of its own 
sphere of influence, extended its official recognition to General de 
Gaulle and unofficially demanded that action be taken to' liqui-
date anti-Soviet gavernments in Spain or wherever else they 
might be functioning. 
The Soviet military and diplamatic offensive has created can-
sternation in many a baurgeois circle. There is every ·reason for 
this consternation. The Allied offensive after W arid War I, 
directed to' the liquidation af balshevism, inspired every Bolshe-
vik and Balshevik-sympathiser in the world with apprehensian 
far the future of the working masses. The apprehension was jus-
tified. The Allied affensive in the form af military intervention 
in the Saviet Union failed. The second phase of the Allied offen-
sive, in the form of Fascist governments thraughout middle 
Eurape was a serious menace to the newly farmed republics, 
including the Soviet Republic. In its autcame, however, it braught 
disaster to the bourgeois world, and apened the gates wide to' 
admit Soviet culture. The Saviet Union is an econalnic and pali-
tical colas sus bestriding the European continent. Its strength and 
its success lie in two chief directians. In the first place, in the 
failure of bourgeais saciety to provide peace and security for its 
own peaple. In the second place, in the success of the Saviet 
Union in offering the only wO'rkable alternative to' bourgeais 
culture thus far inaugurated. 
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IV. THE 5 0 V lET U N ION I N A 5 I A 
Geographically, there is no valid line that marks off Asia from 
Europe. The two continents are supposed to be divided by the Ural 
Mountains, a worn-down range, that has the general appearance 
of a rough plateau. It bears so little resemblance to a barrier that 
Asiatic nomads have been able to sweep across it repeatedly. Actu-
ally, Asia and Europe are one land mass in the same sense that 
eastern United States and Western United States are one land 
mass. The Soviet Union occupies the entire northern section of 
this land block. 
Culturally, Asia differs from Europe. The Asiatic cultures are 
older, and until comparatively recent times were diffused into 
Europe. The last episode in the series took place at the time of the 
Crusades. During recent centuries, however, European culture, 
particularly that connected with technology, . has been diffused 
throughout Asia. The process of this diffusion has involved the 
subjugation of Asia to European control. This process went on in 
Russia, as it did elsewhere, with the steady eastward movement of 
trade, colonization and the expansion of political authority. 
Twentieth century Asia differs from twentieth century Europe 
in four essential respects: ( I) the population of Asia is over 
twice that of Europe; (2) the people of Asia dwell f9r the most 
part in villages and are engaged chiefly in agriculture; (3) European 
technology is more highly developed; (4) European empires had 
succeeded by the end of the last century in reducing almost the 
whole of Asia to colonial status. 
Soviet policy in Asia displays some of the general characteristics 
of Soviet policy in Europe, but since policy is a relationship between 
the policy-making centre and the territory in which policy is made, 
the differences in the objective situations of Europe and Asia have 
necessarily modified Soviet policy-making. 
The Russian Revolution succeeded in replacing a decadent 
monarchy by a Soviet Republic. Events surroundng the Russian 
Revolution were also responsible for eliminating ruling dynasties 
in Germany, Austro-Hungary, Greece and Spain. This breakdown 
in the structure of European monarchies was paralleled by a break-
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down in the structure of European capitalism. The breakdown had 
two aspects. One was domestic. It involved job-insecurity for 
workers and a falling rate of profit for business men. The other 
aspect was colonial. It involved the growth of independence move-
ments, the organization of colonial revolts, systematic boycotts and 
sabotage directed against imperial overlords. The empire system, 
with its centre in Europe and its circumference in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America, was breaking up. The Bolsheviks inherited a 
disrupted empire. Their European capital was surrounded by de-
caying imperial structures. 
Soviet policy in Europe was conditioned by the presence of four 
other great powers: Britain, France, Germany and Italy. There 
was only one great power in Asia: Japan. Europe was accustomed 
to a balance of power. Asia knew no balance except that of com-
peting imperial interests. 
There was a force in Asia, however, which did not exist in 
Europe. The people of Asia were emerging from their colonial 
vassalage. The Chinese Revolution of 1911 preceded the Russian 
Revolution by six years. Nationalist movements were already well 
developed in India and the Near East. Asia was in turmoil long 
before World War 1. The cutting off of manufactured supplies 
from accustomed European sources during that war gave the im-
petus to Asiatic industrialization which pushed Japan quickly to 
the level of a first-class industrial area and added substantially to 
the industrial productive capacity of both India and China. 
Significantly enough, the situation in considerable portions ot 
Asia is quite similar to that existing in the Russia of 1900. Indus-
trialization has made advances, but to a considerable degree it has 
employed foreign capital and has developed under foreign tech-
nical direction. The masses are village dwellers, gaining their liv-
ing by agriculture. There are, however, large industrial and com-
mercial centres in which there is a developed wage-working class, 
the more advanced sections of which are versed in the principles 
of the class struggle and the concepts of Marxian socialism. The 
middle class is small and relatively ineffective. The ruling class 
is divided between landowners, moneylenders, merchants, traders 
and manufacturers, whose interests are divergent and in many cases 
conflicting. For the most part there is no such national solidarity 
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as has been built up in the principal nations of western Europe. 
Japan must be excepted from this description, as must also the 
newly-industrialized areas of Siberia. For the most part, however, 
Asia is dominated by cultural cross-currents, by blurred political 
divisions, by foreign imperial economic and political controls, 
and by the will of a considerable section, particularly among the 
young, that is demanding technical improvements and national 
independence. 
While the bulk of Russian population and technology are still 
centred in Europe, strategic considerations have led to a rapid 
development of various Asiatic territories. The policy of moving 
industry beyond the Urals was well-matured by 1930. World War 
II, which cost Russia important industrial areas adjacent to Poland 
and Czechosovakia, forced the transfer of large industrial units 
into Siberia. The movement of production into Asia may there-
fore be described as one of the major aspects of present Soviet 
policy. This applies to the development of natural resources, 
the building of transportation facilities, the construction of in-
dustries and the transfer of populations. Politically the Soviet 
Union is enlarging its European sphere of control and of interest. 
The basic Soviet movement, however, is undoubtedly Asia-ward. 
What does the Soviet Union want in Asia? 
1. It desires to develop the considerable agricultural, mineral 
and power resources of Russia-in-Asia, as a basis for a pro-
duction area far removed from invading armies and bomb-
ing planes. 
2. Peace and security in Asia will facilitate this development, 
and they are therefore among the primary Asiatic, as they 
are among the primary European, aims of the Soviet Union. 
nationalist organizations, freed from imperial domination 
3. The emergence of colonial movements into well-formulated 
and engaged in the establishment of independent Asiatic 
states. Thus far there is no indication that the Soviet Union 
will go any further in its attempts to influence the internal 
organization of these Asiatic states than it has gone with 
similar states in Europe. Undoubtedly, however, Soviet pol-
icy will aim to have such Asiatic states as border on the 
Soviet Union administered by friendly governments. 
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4. Exclusion from Asia of all non-Asiatic imperial controls. 
5. Exclusion from Asia of any power combination or federa-
tion that .~ight challenge the Asiatic supremacy of the 
Soviet TJnion. 
6. A sufficient limitation upon the existing power of Japan to 
prevent that country from interfering with Soviet Asiatic 
policy, but in the absence of a strong Soviet China, a Japan 
powerful enough to act for the Soviet Union in the capacity 
of a Far Eastern policeman. 
7. Free access, through adequate port facilities, to a free Medi-
terranean, a free Red Sea and Indian Ocean and a free 
Pacific Ocean. 
Soviet relations with Asia have been at least as turbulent as with 
Europe, except that the Soviet Union has not thus far engaged in 
a major war with any Asiatic power. Asia was in turmoil long 
before the Bolshevik Revolution. Tzarist Russia had contributed its 
share toward this turmoil. Aggressive imperial adventures in Korea 
and Manchuria had brought on the Russian-Japanese War of 
1904-5. Britain's far-flung interests in the Near East, India, Tibet 
and the Far East, led the British to use Japan, unofficially before 
1902 and officially from 1902 to 1922, and again unofficially from 
1922 to around 1937, as the British policeman in Asia. It was 
while performing this policing duty in 1904 that Japan attacked 
Port Arthur and administered a heavy naval and military defeat 
to the Tzar's armed forces. At the time, British policy was based 
on the assumption that from the Dardanelles to the Pacific the 
most formidable of Britain's rivals was Tzarist Russia. 
Like every war, the Russian-Japanese War stirred up unrest 
that pointed actively toward revolution. The revolution came first 
in Russia, in 1905, and was followed by a series of nationalist 
movements throughout Asia that culminated in the Chinese Revo-
lution of 1911. Bolshevik revolutionists, among whom Stalin was 
one of the leaders, linked up the colonial nationalist movements 
with bolshevism. European revolutionaries were seeking to over-
throw capitalist imperialism in its European homeland. Colonial 
revolutionaries, through their struggle for independence, were 
administering a check to -the movement for imperial expansion. 
What more natural, the Bolsheviks argued, than that the working 
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class revolutionists of Europe should join hands with their colo-
nial fellow-revolutionists in a simultaneous attempt to crush im-
perialism at its centre and at its circumference? Even before they 
came to power in Russia, therefore, the Bolsheviks had formu-
lated a theory that connected European with colonial revolution. 
Another factor pushed strongly in the same direction. Tzarism 
had ruled over a nation composed of many divergent racial and 
national groups. By keeping these groups at sword's points and 
by using the man power of one to police the others, . the Tzar's 
regime was able to rule over a divided community. Bolshevism 
embodied a program of national cultural self-determination under 
which each minority should enjoy the right to shape its own cul-
tural life in so far as that did not interfere with its neighbors. 
The cultural self-determination of minorities was paralleled by a 
centralized system of social, economic and political planning and 
organization. Instead of living at sword's points, the national 
minorities were expected to cooperate in the interest of the whole 
composite community. 
This formulation of the principle of self-determination in local 
affairs and of centralized control of general matters was translated 
into Asiatic politics first by the Bolshevik renunciation of special 
privileges held by the Tzarist regime in Turkey, Persia and China. 
Second, by active offers of help directed toward nationality groups 
struggling to throw off the shackles of imperial domination. Since 
the high point in Asiatic colonial revolt was China, the high point 
in Bolshevik assistance was reached in that country. Between 1919 
and 1926 Sun Yat-Sen and his followers turned definitely to the 
Soviet Union for help in their independence struggle. After re-
peated attempts to obtain aid from the United States and from 
various European governments, Sun Yat-Sen became convinced that 
his best source of support was the Soviet Union. At the request of 
his government, and of the People's Par.ty which he headed, the 
Soviet Union sent to China a corps of technical assistants that at 
one time numbered approximately three hundred. The titular head 
of this group was Michael Borodin. Under the split in the Chinese 
People's Party (1926-7), and the defection of Chiang Kai-shek, 
Commanding General of the People's Party armies, the Russian 
advisors and technical assistants played an important role in the 
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formulation of policy and in the direction of the Chinese revolu-
tionary movement. 
The split in the People's Party further divided an already seg-
mented China into two contending groups: the Chiang Kai-shek 
regime, in close touch with Chinese business and banking interests 
and with various imperialist governments, of which the most help-
ful financially was the United States, and the Chinese Soviet Gov-
ernment, supported ideologically and to a minor extent materially 
by Moscow. 
Between 1927 and 1936 one of the principal preoccupations 
of the Chiang Kai-shek regime was the organization of a series of 
expeditions financed and equipped in part by western imperialists 
and directed against the Chinese Soviet areas. Agnes Smedley, 
Edgar Snow and others have described these struggles in detail. 
During the same years the chief preoccupation of the Chinese 
Soviets was the organization of a workable planned economy and 
polity that was adapted to the peculiar needs of a semi-colonial 
country seeking independence. The decade ended with the Chinese 
Soviets still functioning and, in December 1936, entering into an 
agreement with the Chiang Kai-shek regime for joint action against 
the Japanese invaders. 
The conflict between Chiang and the Chinese Soviets had af-
forded Japan an opportunity of which she had taken full advantage, 
first by occupying Manchuria, and thus cutting off the easiest 
avenue through which Soviet material assistance could reach China, 
and second, by seizing and occupying portions of North China, 
splitting China away from the Soviet Union and providing Japan 
with a corridor that led into the Lake Baikal region and laid the 
basis for a Japanese military assault aimed at cutting the Trans-
Siberian railroad and adding a slice of eastern Siberia to the rapidly 
expanding Japanese Empire. These developments of Japanese 
major strategy took place between 1931 and 1936, and involved 
the general occupation of China by Japan beginning in 1937. 
No figures are available showing the exact amount of material 
assistance sent by Russia into China during the twenty years that 
ended in 1937. In the first decade the material aid was probably 
considerable. In the second decade it diminished sharply. From 
the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 until the German invasion 
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of Russia in 1941 Soviet aid to China again increased. Military 
necessity forced Soviet supplies to follow old caravan routes con-
verted into extemporized truck roads across the Gobi Desert. U ntH 
the early months of 1942 Soviet aid continued to reach China. 
Then the pressure of invasion necessity and the sharpening differ-
ences between Cl iang and the Chinese Soviet leaders again led 
to the curtailment of Soviet assistance. When the Teheran Con-
ference assembled in 1943 Soviet representatives refused to meet 
with those from China on the technical ground that while China 
was at war \ vith Japan, the Soviet Union was not. Actually the 
reason for this refusal undoubtedly lay in the strained relations 
that had developed between Chiang's regime and the Chinese 
Soviets, involving open warfare and the systematic blockade of 
the Chinese Soviet areas by Chungking troops. The pattern was 
also followed at Dumbarton Oaks, where Soviet representatives 
refused to meet with those of Chiang's government. 
Two nations have had a profound effect upon the development 
of Republican China. One is Japan, the other is Russia. Speaking 
generally, Japan has sought to dominate and ultimately to assimi-
late China as a part of its Far Eastern Empire. With minor excep-
tions Soviet Russia has extended consistent help to the movement 
for a Chinese Republic in the hope that a China directed by a 
Chinese Soviet Government would be able to win its independ-
ence from the western empires, industrialize China, raise the 
standard of well-being of the Chinese masses and by so doing 
blaze the trail toward a Soviet Asia. 
Relations between the Soviet Union and Japan have passed 
through various stages from friendly trade to open conflict. Japa-
nese troops participated in the invasion of Siberia in the summer 
of 1918. The end of the civil conflict in Russia was followed by 
the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan and a decade 
of strained collaboration. Soviet leaders mistrusted the intentions 
of Japanese imperialists and Japanese leaders were greatly dis-
turbed by the existence at Vladivostok of landing fields from 
which the large, numerous and vulnerable industrial centers of 
Japan could be disastrously bombed. 
Japan's Manchurian adventure (1931) introduced an entirely 
new element into the picture. Japanese armed forces were detailed 
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along the Soviet-Manchurian frontier and as the Japanese military 
moved farther into North China, a longer and longer line of 
Soviet frontier was exposed to a possible attack. 
Soviet military forces were distributed along the Soviet side of 
the frontier. Preparations were made to defend the Trans-Siberian 
railway which, for geographic reasons, ran very close to the Chi-
nese territory now occupied by Japan. A new railroad line, well to 
the north of the Trans-Siberian, was projected and constructed 
and a new Soviet seaport was opened to the north of Vladivostok 
and well beyond the range of an immediate Japanese attack. 
For ten years Japanese and Soviet forces faced each other along 
the frontier. Border clashes were reported at frequent intervals. 
At times these clashes rose to the level of major combats in which 
considerable numbers of troops, tanks, planes and artillery were 
employed. Protests were made by both sides and relations were 
strained to the breaking point. But there was no declared war. 
On April 13, 1941, a Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact was signed 
in Moscow. Article I of the Pact declared that ttboth contracting 
parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations 
between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and 
inviolability of the other contracting party." Article II provided 
that if one of the parties should become the object of hostilities 
tton the part of one or several third Powers, the other contracting 
party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the con-
flict. " Under Article III the treaty was to continue for five years 
and then was to be automatically renewed unless one of the par-
ties denounced the pact at least one year before its expiration. 
There was an annex to the treaty under which ttthe two countries 
solemnly declare that the USSR pledge to respect the territorial 
integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo, and Japan pledges to 
restore the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian 
Peoples Republic." 
There has been considerable speculation as to why the Soviet-
Japanese Pact was signed in the Spring of 1941. The Japanese 
Government was preparing to enter the war and desired to free 
herself as much as possible from the necessity of garrisoning the 
Soviet-Manchurian frontier. At the same time, the Japanse Gov-
ernment was a party to the Anti-Comintern Pac~ and as such was 
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more or less committed to a hostile position against the Soviet 
Union. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had signed a some-
what similar agreement with Germany two years earlier and this 
Soviet-Nazi agreement .had been reaffirmed and enlarged in Janu-
ary 194I. The Japanese therefore, in negotiating their pact with 
the Soviet Union, were merely following a precedent already laid 
down by their leading Axis partner. 
The Soviet Union, by signing the pact with Japan, relieved itself, 
at least in theory, from the danger of a two-front war. There were 
many signs in the Spring of 1941 of an impending Nazi attack on 
the Soviet Union. Should that attack come, Soviet military forces 
would be hard-pressed if at the same time they were compelled to 
maintain and supply a large garrison separated from the western 
front by the entire breadth of European Russia and Siberia. 
After the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Pact, reports of border 
conflicts ceased to appear and relations between the two countries 
seemed much less strained. Early in 1944 a supplementary treaty 
was negotiated between the Soviet Union and Japan that had par-
ticular reference to the Japanese concessions in northern Sakhalin. 
The agreement provided that Japan should give up these conces-
sions, that the Soviet Union should pay a stated sum of money to 
Japan, and should in addition deliver a specified amount of the 
petroleum produced in the Sakhalin oil fields. At the same time, 
adjustments were made with regard to Japanese fishing rights in 
Soviet waters. The treaty was sigried in Moscow March 30, 1944. 
Soviet-Japanese political and economic relations were therefore 
readjusted in the Spring of 1944 and there seemed every likeli-
hood that the Pact of April, 1941 would be automatically renewed 
at its expiration on April 13, 1946. Major political strategy, how-
ever, pressed strongly from several directions. There was a possi-
bility that the Japanese High Command, checked in its attempt 
to enlarge its territorial controls in southern Asia, might strike 
north and attempt to take over the richly endowed territories of 
eastern Siberia, add them to the resources of l\lanchuria and North 
China and thus provide an extensive continental base for provision-
ing its war against the United Nations. The Soviet Union, on its 
side, was in a rather serious predicament. It was aIIied with Great 
Britain and was receiving extensive lend-lease supplies from the 
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United States that were being used in a j oint war against Germany. 
Germany was the senior partner in the Axis Alli~nce of which 
Japan was now the only remaining important member. Quite 
logically, the Soviet Union was being urged, directly or indirectly, 
to make available Siberian bases from which the Anglo-Americans 
might carryon their war against Japan. The Soviet Union was 
receiving considerable quantities of lend-lease through its Pacific 
ports. This commerce was of course subj ect to interference by the 
Japanese sea and air forces. Furthermore, should Japan be defeated 
by Anglo-American forces without the assistance of the Soviet 
Uruon the settlement of many important Asiatic questions might 
be made by the British and Americans without consulting the Soviet 
Union. 
These and other considerations led Premier Stalin in his speech 
of November 6, 1944 commemorating the Bolshevik Revolution, 
to make the following comment on Soviet-Japanese relations: HIt 
cannot be considered accidental that such unpleasant facts occurred 
as the incident at Pearl Harbor, the loss of the Philippines, and 
other islands in the Pacific Ocean, the loss of Hong Kong and 
Singapore, when Japan as an aggressive nation proved more pre-
pared for war than Great Britain and the United States, which 
pursued a policy of peace." This statement evidently meant that 
the Soviet Government was seriously considering a termination of 
the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. Five months later, the Soviet 
Foreign Office issued a statement giving Japan official notice of 
Soviet intention to terminate the pact at its expiration in April 
1946. 
One other item should be mentioned in the catalog of Soviet 
relations in Asia, -the oil reserves and oil concessions of Persia. 
The Soviet oil position was relatively strong before the beginning 
of World War II. Production figures for 1938 credited the Soviet 
Union with 77% of European oil production for that year. Rou-
mania had 18 %, and of the remaining 5 %, Germany had 1.5 and 
Poland 1.3. As the war progressed, the oil reserves of Asia Minor 
took on new significance. Rumor had it that the oil deposits in 
Saudi Arabia were the most extensive untapped reserves in the 
world. To the north and east lay the oil fields of Mesopotamia and 
Persia. Still farther north were the principal oil fields of European 
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Russia. Secretary of the Interior Ickes, from his vantage point as 
United States petroleum administrator, launched an ambitious 
program involving the drilling of wells in Arabia and the trans-
portation of the oil produced to Mediterranean ports through 
American-built pipe lines. The proposal aroused particular inter-
est because the oil fields of the Eastern Mediterranean were at 
that time dominated by British capital and American oil concerns 
were trying to secure a foothold in the area. 
The United States proposals led to counter-proposals from 
Great Britain and the dispatch of a mission, headed by Lord 
Beaverbrook, to discuss the entire problem with representatives of 
the Washington Government. The upshot of this discussion was 
the «Agreement on Petroleum between the Gbvernment of the 
United States of America and the Government of the U njted 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland", signed Au-
gust 8, 1944 by Acting Secretary of State Stettinius and Lord 
Beaverbrook. Textually the agreement provided that ((preparatory 
to ·the convocation of a world petroleum conference for the nego-
tiation of a multilateral agreement . . . the two governments 
agree that the development of petroleum resources for interna-
tional trade should be expanded in an orderly manner on a world-
wide basis." Whatever the intention of the signers, the Anglo-
American Oil Agreement sounded like a proposal under which 
the two principal capitalist nations were to divide between them-
selves oil .reserves that promised to be an extrem·ely important 
source of post-war economic and military power. 
During the critical period of World War II, when Axis forces 
were winning important victories and were evidently moving to 
occupy Suez and to make a junction with their Japanese partners 
somewhere in the Indian Ocean, Persia became an object of con-
siderable strategic importance. This importance was enhanced by 
the fact that supplies for the Soviet Union were being shipped to 
the Persian Gulf and transported overland to the Soviet battle-
fronts. To forestall Axis occupation of Persia, the country was 
occupied by the Red Army in the north, and by the British, later 
supplemented by American armed forces in the south. British oil 
interests in Persia were centred in the south and the British were 
in a position to bring considerable pressure to bear upon the Per-
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sian Government. While the evidence is far from complete, there 
seems reason to believe that British and American interests were 
seeking additional concessions from the Persian Government, 
whereupon the Soviet Government proposed that parallel oil 
concessions be granted to the Soviet Union in the northern por-
tion of Persia then occupied by the Red Army. 
These proposals, which were made during 1944, accorded ill 
with the Declaration on Iran adopted by Roosevelt, Stalin and 
Churchill at their Teheran meeting in November 1943. The Iran 
Declaration had provided that the three governments "will con-
tinue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic 
assistance as may be possible." The last paragraph of the Declara-
tion stated that the three governments "are at one with the 
Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the 
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran." 
The refusal of the Iran Government to grant the Soviet con-
cessions or any other concessions during the continuance of the 
war led to a change of administrations, to denunciations in the 
Soviet press, and ultimately to a suspension, at least as far as 
public activity was concerned, of the whole program for dividing 
up Near East oil reserves. In theory at least the issue remains in 
abeyance, but during the controversy over these oil reserves Mos-
cow had served notice upon London and Washington that it was 
prepared to assert its claim to a fair share of such important 
economic advantages as Near East oil. 
Irrespective of theoretical considerations, it seems obvious that 
Soviet policy has been evolving in Asia as it has been evolving in 
Europe. Whatever the Soviet attitude- toward Asiatic problems 
may have been during the 'critical 1930s, Soviet policy in Asia is 
now. defensive in name only. With the progressive weakening of 
Japan under Anglo-American pressure, and the increasing proba-
bility of a severe military defeat, the Soviet Union remains as the 
only important resident power in Asia. British-American and 
other western imperialist groups mayor may not retain or re-
establish their colonial position in the East Indies, in the Pacific 
Islands or on the Asiatic mainland. The Soviet Union after the 
defeat of Japan will be the one Asiatic nation with an immediate 
post-war industrial and military potential. The end of the war in 
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Europe enabled Soviet diplomacy to take increasing advantage of 
this unique strategic position. 
There are two avenues along which Soviet policy in Asia may 
move. The first is that already well established in Europe-a firm-
ly held Soviet frontier bordered by a number of friendly govern-
ments, free to conduct their local affairs as they see fit, but 
strongly bound to Moscow in all matters involving foreign policy. 
Beginnings in this direction have already been made. The Outer 
Mongolian Peoples Republic has been functioning for more than 
,twenty years in this capacity. Since some time in 1944 an obscure 
conflict has been progressing in Chinese Turkestan that may easily 
convert that territory into a Singkiang Peoples Republic resembl-
ing that of Outer Mongolia. The Chinese Soviet areas offer a third 
possibility in this same general direction. Whether Manchuria 
will be returned to China or be converted into a friendly border 
state dependent upon the Soviet Union for its major policies is 
a matter that will be decided as a result of the defeat of Japan. 
In Asia as in Europe an important power centre is in process 
of liquidation. The liquidation of a power centre necessarily in-
volves the redistribution of the power elements composing that 
centre. The Japanese ruling class hoped to create a Far East em-
pire of continental dimensions. By 1942 they had established such 
an organization, at least in temporary form. The disintegration of 
the Far East Prosperity Sphere will be followed by one or more 
reintegrations of power. For example, the whole of China may be 
unified under a strong central government, including Manchuria 
and a semi-independent Korea. India and Burma may be federa-
ted under ,the British Empire or with independent status. Similar-
ly, an Arab federation may unify important areas of Asia Minor. 
These are possibilities. The overwhelming probability is that the 
Soviet Union will follow the general policy in Asia that it has 
been following in Europe, discouraging federations of any con-
siderable magnitude and encouraging the organization of minor 
states friendly to the Soviet Union. Insofar as independence for 
Asiatic colonial territories will eliminate foreign imperial con-
trols from the area, ,the Soviet Union may be expected to continue 
its policy of encouraging colonial nationalist movements. 
The second avenue for Soviet-Asiatic policy differs susbtantially 
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from that of maintaining numerous satellite states. It involves the 
establishment and support of a power or powers capable of main-
taining economic and political stability under the general direc-
tion of S-oviet policy. Japan performed this police function for 
Britain through several decades. If Japanese power is thoroughly 
liquidated it will be in no position to perform a similar function 
under the direction of the Soviet Union. If Soviet spokesmen 
decide on this aspect of power politics they will be compelled to 
build up in India, China or perhaps in both territories, political 
units strong enough to do continental policing, and also well 
enough supplied with the implements of power to check or pre-
vent aggression by any of the western empires, and ultimately to 
terminate their imperial strangle-hold on Asiatic peoples. 
One vitally important issue remains to 'be considered-that of 
the Pacific. The Pacific Ocean in the next few decades will un-
doubtedly become one of .the most important if not the most 
important area of world trade, commerce, industrial development 
and social expansion. Should one nation succeed in dominating 
the Pacific it would enjoy the power advantages accompanying 
such a development. For a long time to come it seems unlikely 
that the Soviet Union will be in a position to throw into the Paci-
fic area a volume of wealth or manpower sufficient to ensure Paci-
fic domination. If that is the case and if Soviet diplomacy proposes 
to maintain a considerable degree of influence in the Pacific area, 
this must in all probability be done through the agency of an 
Asiatic police nation. To date, the only candidate for such a posi-
tion is Japan. No other Asiatic nation has the industrial plant 
and the skilled man power necessary to carry through such an 
ambitious program. If Japan is to act with the Soviet Union as a 
counterpoise to maintain the Pacific balance of power, Soviet 
policy must necessarily protect Japan against a too serious military 
or economic defeat. 
Japanese empire builders attempted with only moderate success 
to build up an ((Asia for the Asiatics" policy in which other 
Asiatic countries could participate with a considerable degree of 
autonomy. While the Japanese used the slogan, they insisted 
upon centralizing most of the power in Tokyo. 
The Soviet Union is an Asiatic power, controlling a large geo-
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graphic area and is in many respects the most important industrial 
area in Asia. There is every possibility that the Soviet leaders may 
take a leaf out of Japan's torn notebook, revive the "Asia for the 
Asiatics" slogan and launch a Pan-Asia movement that might 
closely resemble the Pan-American movement headed by the 
United States. In pursuit of such a policy the Soviet Union 
would not only have the advantage of American precedent, but 
through American insistence in San Francisco, the United Nations 
has been so organized as to permit this type of dominated, region-
al federation. All things considered, the Soviet Union may find 
that such a development will follow the line of least resistance, 
will liberate Asia from foreign imperial control and establish the 
Soviet Union in a role that, for the time being, is as dominant as 
the role played by the United States in the Pan-American Union. 
Soviet policy makers will probably follow at least one of these 
suggested paths. They may follow all three, emphasizing one or 
the other as circumstances dictate. There is one thing very certain, 
however. Unless there is an internal breakdown in Soviet admin-
istration, and of this there is now not the slightest indication, 
the Soviet role in Asiatic affairs will be at least as important as 
that in European affairs. In all probability it will be more impor-
tant, due to the absence in or near Asia of any power competent 
to challenge or checkmate the Soviet Union. 
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v. THE U. S. S. R. AND THE U. S. A. 
Thus far in our consideration of the Soviet Union as a world 
power we have discussed the relations between Soviet Russia and 
a partially wrecked Europe, as well as relations between Soviet 
Russia and an Asia emerging from colonialism. We now turn to 
a very different theme-the Soviet Union and the United States. 
These two countries are the colossi O'f Marshal Smuts' Empire 
Parliamentary Association speech: ttRussia is the new colossus in 
Europe ... Then, outside Europe, you have the United States, the 
other great world power. You will therefore have these three great 
Powers: Russia, the colossus of Europe; Great Britain, with her 
feet in all continents, but crippled materially here in Europe, and 
the United States of America with enormO'us assets, with wealth 
and resources and potentialities of power beyond measure." 
Marshal Smuts is not alone in rating the Soviet Union and the 
United States as the top-ranking powers of the world. Sumner 
Welles holds the same point of view: ttln the first post-war years 
the two greatest powers, both from a material as well as from a 
military standpoint, will be the United States and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics. Frank recognition . of this fact must 
underlie any consideratiO'n of the policy which this government 
should pursue toward the Soviet Union." (Time f~rDelcision. 
p. 306) *. A McGraw-Hill editorial O'n Russia, Threat or Prom-
ise, which occupied a full page in the Washington Post of Octo-
ber 18th, 1944, assumed that ttwhen this war is ended, two 
nations-the United States and Russia-will possess the bulk of 
the world's military and industrial might." In The Stlper Powers, 
W. T. R. Fox argues that: ((It will be a commonplace after the 
war to speak of the United States and the Soviet Union as the 
tBig Two' whose falling out will be the curtain-raiser fO'r the 
Third World War." (p. 101.) 
In our discussion of the Soviet Union as a world power we 
reached the conclusion that in terms of the recognized power 
essentials the Soviet Union must be rated among the foremost 
nations of the world. It now appears that we must go a step far-
* Used by permission of the publishers, Harper & Brothers, New York. 
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ther and assert that the Soviet Union must be rated as one of the 
two foremost nations. 
After the defeat of Germany the Soviet Union stood head and 
shoulders above the remaining nations of continental Europe. 
Before Pearl Harbor it was the only Asiatic nation other than J a-
pan which might be rated as a major factor in world affairs. With 
the defeat of Japan the Soviet Union will be the only modern 
power in Asia. Both in Europe and Asia, therefore, the Soviet 
Union stands out as a giant among pygmies. By comparison with 
the United States, however, the Soviet Union faces another giant. 
There is no easy way to compare the power potential of the So-
viet Union and the United States. Both are continental in area, the 
Soviet Union occupying nearly three times as much contiguous 
territory as the United States. Both have abundant resources, those 
of the Soviet Union largely untouched; those of the United States 
depleted to some degree. Both countries have an ample agricultu-
ral base, with fertile land and climatic variations adapted t~ the 
production of a variety of food and agricultural industrial raw 
materials. Speaking from the standpoint of geography therefore, 
the Soviet Union and the United States are two North Temperate 
Zone powers amply equipped with natural advantages. In terms 
of productivity the United States enjoys a consiqerable advantage 
particularly in its capacity to turn out production goods and heavy 
consumer goods on a mass scale. The consumer goods markets of 
the United States have been glutted with commodities for two 
generations, and the average American household is. therefore far 
better equipped with a consumer goods surplus than households 
in the Soviet Union. United States man power is better trained 
technically than in the Soviet Union. On the other ~hand, the total 
of Soviet man power exceeds that of the United States by about 
50 percent, and the net annual population gain in the Soviet 
Union is considerably above that in the United States. In terms of 
leadership and management the Soviet Union ranks lower than 
the United States as far as experience and technical competence 
are concerned. At the same time, the average age of Soviet leader-
ship is less than that in the United States. The military apparatus 
of the United States is well manned and particularly well sup-
plied with mechanical equipment. The United States navy and 
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air force are larger than those of the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
army, however, is probably larger than that of the United States 
and has proved itself phenomenally efficient in its conflict with the 
Axis. Finally, in our listing of power ingredients comes the question 
of unity, solidarity and public morale. There is ample evidence 
that despite staggering material and human losses, far exceeding 
those of the United States, the Soviet population has displayed 
steadiness and willingness to stand up under conditions of ex-
treme hardship. It is possible that the United States population, 
faced with a similar situation, would have displayed equal soli-
darity and tenacity of purpose . 
. One other factor should be mentioned in a comparison between 
the power position of the Soviet Union and the United States. 
The Soviet Union represents a new social system, or perhaps 
more correctly, a revolutionary adaptation of the existing social 
order to conditions in the mid-twentieth century. The United 
States, on the other hand, is dominated by a social order that 
had its rise in Europe, that was transferred as a mature cul-
ture to North America, and that is now displaying in North 
America the same characteristics of culture decay that exist in 
the European countries still supporting a free enterprise economy. 
If this is a correct sociological description, the United States 
labors under the disadvantage of domination by a decaying social 
order, while the Soviet Union enjoys the advantage of a new and 
far more vigorous social apparatus. 
There is no attempt here to. line the two countries up side by 
side and to assert that one is stronger than the other. Rather, the 
power potentials of the two are listed, and the conclusion to be 
drawn is that these two countries are both immensly strong in 
the essentials of power. In some respects the Soviet Union is 
ahead; in other respects the United States leads. 
Quite irrespective of the relative strength of the Soviet Union 
and the United States, it seems obvious from what we have been 
saying thus far that the post-war world will have two dominant 
power poles. One will be located in Eurasia, the other in North 
America. The Soviet Union and the United States will be the two 
main centres of political and social gravity. These major bodies 
will draw minor bodies to them with ,the same gravitational force 
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that is exerted in the physical sphere by large bodies over small 
bodies. Small nations will be drawn toward these power centres 
with the same irresistible force that the powerful have always 
been able to maintain over the weak. The small nations of Europe 
and Asia are already feeling the pull of the Sovief centre of grav-
ity. The nations of the Americas were long ago drawn within the 
United States sphere of political influence. 
There may possibly be a third post-war power centre. Attempts 
will be made to establish one in western Europe with the British 
Isles as the nucleus. Plans are already far-advanced to set up a 
power centre in China. The leaders of Argentina and other Latin 
American countries hope to organize a power centre in South 
America. These are possibilities. The actuality of the immediate 
post-war world will be two centres of power, one focussed in 
Moscow, the other in Washington. Slnall nations, weak nations 
and colonial peoples seeking liberation must perforce choose be-
tween these two major power possibilities. In mos't instances the 
choice has already been made. There will be. defections and re-
alignment, but in general it can be predicted that the gravity pull 
of these ·two poles will vary inversely as the square of the dis-
tance between them and the small powers. Those in close proxi-
mity to the Soviet Union will of necessity be drawn Sovietward. 
Those in close proximity to the United States will with equal 
necessity be drav/n United Statesward. 
We have no immediate experience in dealing with a two pole 
world. Through the greater part of the 19th century Britain was 
THE World Power. Then, as the struggle to redivide the world 
matured, several competing powers replaced the One. During the 
half century preceding World War I nearly a dozen powers had 
world leadership pretensions. Between W orId Wars I and II the 
number was cut to six or eight. With the defeat of the Axis 
forces, the devastation of Germany and Japan, and the humbling 
of France and Italy, another drastic cut in the number of world 
powers has been made. 
It will be necessary for us to readjust both .thought and action 
to the conditions surrounding a two pole world. At the moment 
we are asking ourselves what the relations between these two 
poles will probably be. We shall begin by discussing some of 
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the contact points between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. We shall then continue by asking whether these contact 
points are likely to develop friction and to become conflict points. 
Historically, the relations between Russia and the United States 
have been almost uniformly peaceful. Twice Tzarist Russia actively 
assisted the United States. The second time, during the American 
Civil War, the intervention was of the greatest importance to the 
Washington Government. Neither country has ever gone to war 
against the other. With the exception of United States invasion of 
Soviet territory during the counter-revolution, relations between 
the two countries have been unmarred by military conflict. 
The record is especially relnarkable because throughout the 
entire history of the United States the Russian government has 
been almost completely antithetical to the American government. 
When the English colonies were federated in a democratic repub-
lic, Russia had one of the most absolute mon~rchies then in exist-
ence. This Russian monarchy continued in power until 1917 when 
it was replaced by a revolutionary government, the declared object 
of whicli was the liquidation of bourgeois democracy and the sub-
stitution of a world-wide federation of workers republics. How 
did it come about that two governments so apparently opposite suc-
ceeded in maintaining peaceful relations for a century and a half? 
Professor P. A. Sorokin has attempted to answer this question 
in Russia and the U.S.A. Professor Sorokin marvels at tcthe 
miracle of a lasting, unbroken peace . . . between these two 
countries, extending throughout the entire history of the United 
States." (p. 15) ' nWhen both countries, have happened to be in-
volved in the same V/ar, they have invariably been ranged on the 
same side, fighting a common enemy, whether in the case of the 
Boxer uprising, the war of 1914-18, or the present war." (Ibid., 
p. 17) ' Sorokin attempts to explain this seeming miracle in terms 
of what he describes as similar socio-cultural traits. 
The Sorokin explanation acquires peculiar significance because 
of the unusual background of the author. Professor Sorokin was 
a prominent sociologist in pre-revolutionary Russia. As an official 
in the Kerensky regime he came into conflict with the Bolsheviks, 
left Russia and resumed his academic career in the United States, 
where he has taught and written for two decades .. He is now head 
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of the Department of Sociology in Harvard. He has thus had the 
unique experience of building an academic career in both Russia 
and the United States. Out of this experience he writes his com-
parison of the two countries. 
Professor Sorokin contends that the differences between Russia 
and the United States are superficial, while the similarities are 
fundamental. The village background, he argues, is much the 
same in both countries. The organization of the family, the status 
of women, the forms of local, municipal and ' provincial self-gov-
ernment, the legal and the judicial systems of the two are strik-
ingly similar in many respects. Both countries are inhabited by 
pioneer types. Both occupy vast, sparsely populated continental 
areas. Both have been expanding consistently through several 
generations. The Russian people and the American .people are both 
interested in science and passionately devoted to technology. The 
American people have been free to express their scientific and 
technical interests since their separation from the British Mother-
land. The Russians were liberated scientifically and technologically 
by the Revolution of 1917. Both in terms of institutions and of 
world outlook these two peoples are following closely parallel 
courses. Geographically they are barely in contact. In terms of po-
litical ideologies they are at variance. But the major socio-cultu-
ral forces point toward collaboration rather than toward conflict. 
Peaceful relations between Russia and the United States are a 
matter of history. The explanation of these peaceful relations lies 
in the realm of social theory. Certainly Professor Sorokin has 
offered an analysis which has the appearance of authenticity. 
Expansion in the broad social sense of extending influence over 
outlying territory is possible in terms of trade, conqu"est and ideas. 
The American Revolution of 1 776 gave the United States an op-
portunity to expand ideologically. The Russian Revolution of 1917 
gave the Soviet Union a similar opportunity. During the 19th 
century United States technology gained world-wide influence. 
Since the middle 1920s Soviet techniques of social reorganization 
have influenced the thinking and have helped to shape the social 
policy of nations and peoples on every continent. It is quite con-
ceivable that at some point in the not distant future another centre 
of cultural expansion may develop. The Axis powers tried to estab-
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lish such a centre and failed in their attempt. In the absence of 
some such development the United States and the Soviet Union 
will remain the two present-day centres of cultural, social and po-
litical expansion. They will touch in Europe. They will make direct 
contact in the Pacific. The two countries represent contrasting and 
rival social systems. Can they live together in peace or must contact 
mature into conflict? 
Immediately after the Russian Revolution Lenin raised the ques-
tion of socialism overtaking and outdistancing the capitalist world. 
From the Bolshevik point of view the science and technology 
developed under capitalism were indispensable tools for socialist 
construction. Capitalism had evolved these tools. Socialists must 
learn to make them and to use them, must improve them "and must 
ultimately supersede them. The Bolsheviks thus proposed to take 
over the results of capitalist achievement and make them a part of 
the techniques of socialist construction. Such an attitude involved 
neither animosity nor antagonism. In fact, the Bolsheviks felt a 
very great admiration for the technical devices of capitalism and 
desired to make them their own. 
The attitude in the capitalist world was of necessity profoundly 
different. The Bolsheviks sought to supersede capitalism. The 
capitalists desired to conserve and defend their institutions and 
ideas against a revolutionary ideology and a political revolutionary 
force that threatened their prerogatives and privileges. Spokesmen 
for private property and big business felt that they had nothing to 
learn from the builders of socialism, whereas if the socialists suc-
ceeded the capitalists had everything to lose. Consequently when 
in March 1921 an appeal was made to the United States Depart-
ment of State to re-establish business relations with the Soviet 
Union, Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes on March 25, 1921 
replied through the American Consul at Reval that the American 
government viewed ~'with deep sympathy and grave concern the 
plight of the Russian people", and desired to aid in every possible 
way in establishing commercial relations with them. Secretary 
Hughes, however, agreed with Mr. Hoover, then Secretary of Com-
merce, that under the existing economic system Russia could make 
no return to production and therefore had no commercial future. 
HIt is only in the productivity of Russia that there is any hope for 
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the Russian people," Secretary Hughes wrote. HIt is idle to expect 
resumption of trade until the economic bases of production are 
securely established." These bases must include ((the safety of life, 
the recognition of firm guarantees O'f private property, the sanctity 
of contracts and the rights of free labor" . Until Russia was pre-
pared to mak~ such readjustments in its internal economic life, the 
Secretary of State saw no possibility or resuming trade relations. 
President CoO'lidge took the same position two years later. 
(Message to Congress Dec. 6, 1923.) He held that the United 
States could not enter into relations with another country which 
refused to recognize ((the sanctity of international obligations" or 
((the cherished rights of humanity." President Coolidge expressed 
a desire ' ((to make very large concessions for the purpose of res-i 
cuing the people of Russia." ((Whenever there appears any disPO'-
sition. to compensate our citizens who were despoiled, and to 
recO'gnize that debt contracted with our government, not by the 
Tzar but by the newly formed republic of Russia; whenever the 
active spirit of enmity to our institutions is abated; whenever 
there appear works meet for repentance; our country ought to be 
the first to go to the economic and mtoral rescue of Russia." It 
was from such lofty eminences of economic and moral superiority 
that United States officials looked down upon the spokesmen of 
the infant Soviet Republic. 
Ten years later, after the United States had tasted the bitter-
ness of economic defeat, President Roosevelt did condescend to 
recognize the Soviet Union. Recognition was extended, however, 
only after Foreign Commissar Litvinov had agreed in his letter of 
Nov. 16, 1933, ((to refrain, and to restrain all persons in govern-
ment service and all organizations of the government or under its 
direct or indirect control ... from any act overt or covert liable in 
any way whatsoever to' injure the tranquility, prosperity, order, or 
security of the whole O'r any part of the United States, its territories 
O'r possessions, and, in particular, from any act tending to incite 
or encourage armed intervention, or any agitation or propaganda 
having as an aim the violation of the territorial integrity of the 
United States, its territories or possessions, or the bringing about 
by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole 
O'r any part of the United States, its territories or possessions." 
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Thus the U !1ited States government maintained its position of 
moral superiority and extended recognition to the Soviet Union 
sixteen years after the beginning of the revolution. 
During the interval, and in fact until 1941 or 1942, attitudes 
in the two countries were maintained at very much the same 
divergent levels. The Soviet Union continued to admire American 
technological achievements. Throughout these years no anti-
American sentiment was discernible among the Russian people. 
On the contrary, even Russian school children were well-informed 
about detailed matters affecting American life, while Russian 
adults were omnivorously curious regarding United States insti-
tutions and practices. «Had the visitor to Russia seen Boulder 
Dam? How did it compare with Dneiperstroy? Had he visited 
the Ford factory in Detroit? Was Bolshevik tempo up to Amer-
ican industrial tempo? Did the leadership of the American Fede-
ration of Labor represent the viewpoint of American workers?" 
There were endless variations on such questions, which were 
never asked with either envy or animosity but out of a desire to 
learn as a means of improving Soviet techniques. 
American attitudes during the same period were dominated by 
fear and hatred of Bolshevism and all its works. The most fan-
tastic and ridiculous stories were printed in United States news-
papers and circulated over the radio and by word of mouth. Any 
distortion that reflected discredit on the Soviet Union was taken 
up and endlessly repeated. Facts to the credit of the new regime 
were ignored or suppressed. At one stage in this campaign of 
mendacity the New Republic made a detailed study of New York 
Times reporting on the Soviet Union, which showed that the 
Titnes had been taking a consistent anti-Soviet attitude. The 
Times pretended to do a job in objective reporting. The Hearst 
and Scripps-Howard papers made no such pretence. They were 
openly and bitterly anti-Soviet. The most ambitious anti-Soviet 
educational campaign in the United States was carried on by the 
Roman Catholic Church. Through all of the publicity agencies at 
its disposal the Catholic Hierarchy preached and taught anti-So-
vietism. Various business organizations, the American Legion, the 
American Federation of Labor, and other influential associations 
carried on the anti-Soviet campaign. Attempts were made by 
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various minority groups to counter anti-Soviet propaganda. For 
every pro-Soviet word that was uttered or printed, however, there 
were a hundred or a thousand on the other side. Consequently, an 
entire generation of American people gained its outlook on world 
affairs through a haze of anti-Soviet propaganda. That generation 
is now coming to manhood and womanhood. It constitutes a hard 
kernel of anti-Sovietism which must play an important role in 
determining Soviet-American relations through the coming years. 
Suppose we now attempt to translate the history of Russian-
American friendliness and the sharply divergent Soviet attitude 
toward the United States, and the United States attitude toward the 
Soviet Union into political terms. By so doing we shall establish 
a background against which Soviet-American relations have been 
developing during the past few years, and against which they must 
continue to develop during the years which lie immediately ahead. 
Such an analysis must begin with a brief statement of the general 
foreign policy of the two countries in relation to each other. 
Soviet -United States relations grow out of different attitudes in 
the two countries. They also grow out of different power posi-
tions. U.S.A. business interests girdle the globe. Wherever profit-
possibilities present themselves United States business . men have 
interests based upon trade, commerce, communications, raw mate-
rials and investments. 
Soviet policy makers are not in business. Soviet interests there-
fore are restricted primarily to territory that surrounds the Soviet 
Union or to issues that involve Soviet security. The United States 
has vital interests in the Philippines, China, Malaya, Iran, Arabia, 
Italy and Germany, as well as in the Americas. The Soviet Union, 
on the other hand has few interests in Latin America. Thus while 
American interests extend into territory that borders the Soviet 
Union, Soviet interests do not extend, to anything like the same 
degree, into territory that borders the United States. 
These differences of interests are brought out very clearly in the 
two recent controversies over Argentina and Poland. The United 
States has a sphere of influence that includes the Western Hemis-
phere. Quite as a matter of course United States officials extend or 
withhold credit and lend-lease, recognize or refuse to recognize la-
tin American governments that win the approval of Washington 
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or labor under its disapproval. This policy reached a point of high 
intensity in the case of the Farrell regime in Argentina. -The regime 
was denounced by Secretary of State Hull and President Roosevelt. 
Restrictions were placed on commerce; credits were frozen. At-
tempts were made to line up other Latin American countries and 
Great Britain for a general boycott of the Farrell regime. The 
Soviet Union took no public part in the controversy. The Americas 
were a region in which United States interests were paramount 
and whatever Soviet sympathies may have been, Soviet officials 
stuck to their knitting. 
How different the situation in Poland! Poland bears the same 
geographic relation to the Soviet Union that Cuba or Mexico bears 
to the United States. Twice in a generation Russia has been invaded 
through Poland. The pre-war Polish regime was anti-Soviet. The 
Soviet Union, as a matter of major policy, proposed that the post-
war government of Poland should be friendly to the Soviet Union. 
Throughout the war the British Government, headed by an 
anti-Soviet Tory, Winston Churchill, had maintained in London 
a Polish Government-in-Exile that in its general attitude and in 
its personnel was quite definitely pro-British and anti-Soviet. Dur-
ing the same period the Soviet Government had backed a Polish 
Government-in-Exile in Moscow. With Europe divided into two 
major spheres of influence-British in the west and south; Soviet 
in the east, Poland became buffer territory and an object of special 
interest to both London and Moscow. 
What did Washington do under these circumstances? Wash-
ington intervened aggressively and insistently, although no United 
States sphere of influence was involved. When Moscow recognized 
the Lublin Polish Government in I944 London and Washington 
both reaffirmed their recognition of the London Polish Govern-
ment-in-Exile. 
Soviet interests and Soviet policy both call for non-interv:ention 
in a controversy between Washington and Buenos Aires. Latin 
America is a United States sphere of influence. United States 
interests and United States policy both call for intervention in a 
controversy between London and Moscow over Poland. United 
States interests are planet-wide. 
Since these decisions deal with the Soviet role in world affairs, 
75 
we shall first state the issues of major politics that exist between 
the Soviet Union and the United States from the Soviet point of 
view: i, I; 
. I 
1. The Soviet Union has special interests in the territory that 
borders directly upon the U.S.S.R. 
2. These special interests are in the first place defensive. Moscow 
desires to protect its territory against military aggression. It 
also desires to protect its social order against the disorders and 
disturbances that accompany civil war in neighboring countries. 
3. Soviet special interests are likewise economic. The Soviet 
Union wishes access. to raw materials such as oil, to harbors 
and other channels of transportation and communication. The 
Soviet Union desires to extend the practice of economic plan-
ning far enough to link up Soviet economy with the economy 
of surrounding countries. 
4. Soviet special interests are also cultural. The Soviet Union 
would prefer to be surrounded by ctprogressive" communi-
ties: that is, communities that are developing Soviet or 
socialist institutions. 
In addition to these Soviet special interests. in contiguous terri-
tory which affect the United States only indirectly as they affect 
the social system of which the United States is a part, there are 
several aspects of Soviet foreign policy that affect the United 
States directly, as a major world power. 
5. The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the presence 
l-
of a non-European world power on the European mainland. 
This statement applies to military occupation primarily, al-
though it would necessarily refer to the establishment of basic 
economic interests which might lead to political and therefore 
ultimately to military involvement. At this juncture in world 
affairs only one non-European power could qualify as a pos-
sible agency for the establishment of controls in Europe. Dur-
ing World War I United States military forces were present 
for a short period but were promptly withdrawn at the term-
ination of the war. They were in Europe long enough, how-
ever, to take part in the military occupation of portions of 
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Soviet Russia. During World War II United States military 
forces have been in Europe and Africa since 1941. According 
to present plans they will remain as occupying forces i~ 
Germany and perhaps elsewhere for an indefinite period. 
6. The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to a non-Asiatic 
world power on the Asiatic mainland. Up to the time of the 
Russian Revolution every world power except the United 
States held colonial territories on the mainland of Asia. The 
United States occupied the Philippines. Germany was elimi-
nated as a colonial power in Asia as a result of World War 1. 
The outcome of World War II is not yet definite but it seems 
quite possible that as a result of the Cairo Declaration of Dec. 
1, 1943 Japan will be eliminated from the Asiatic mainland. 
Even though French control of Indo China is re-established, 
only one major non-Asiatic power, Great Britain, will occupy 
a strong position in Asia, unless the United States succeeds 
through its influence with the Chungking Government in 
securing a continental foothold. 
7 . Nor can the Soviet Union remain indifferent to the establish-
ment of any rival world power centre in Asia, no matter how 
that centre may be constituted. The Axis combination in 
Europe was such a centre. The Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere 
was such a potential centre. 
8. The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to a monopoly 
established by anyone power over the Atlantic, the Pacific, or 
over any essential channel of communication such as the Dar-
danelles, SueZ' or the Straits of Malacca. Such monopolies in 
the past have enabled their holders. to practice a strategy of 
economic strangulation t~at might be disadvantageous or dis-
astrous to any rival power. 
Most of these eight generalizations regarding Soviet policy are 
obvious enough. All of them are based on the evidence alread) 
presented in our discussions of Soviet relations with Europe and 
Asia. They constitute a summary of the policies which the Soviet 
Union seems to be pursuing or seems likely to pursue in the im-
mediate future, in its dealing with the United States or with any 
other world power. 
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What can be said in parallel fashion regarding the foreign 
policy of the United States? 
1. The simplest generalization regarding United States foreign 
policy is purely negative: the United States has no consistent 
policy. There are three reasons for this. First, those who make 
United States policy are not of one mind. Since the policy 
makers do not agree, a unified, consistent policy is out of the 
question. Second, the United States has moved so rapidly from 
a position of isolationism into that of a first-class world 
power, that its policy makers have had neither time nor 
opportunity to formulate a policy consistent with the greatly 
expanded economic and political interests of the country. 
Third, United States policy has shifted irresponsibly from iso-
lation to intervention and back again ever since the period 
immediately preceding the Spanish-American War of 1898. 
2. The United States, like every other major capitalist country, has 
followed a policy of dollar diplomacy. Business men have been 
encouraged by the Department of Commerce and other gov-
ernment agencies to set up profit-seeking enterprises beyond 
United States frontiers. Behind these enterprises the govern-
ment has put its diplomatic and consular services and various 
government departments, including the army and navy. 
3. Early in the 19th century the United States declared a policy 
known as the Monroe Doctrine, under which the United 
States refuses to permit any non-American power to establish 
political or military control in the Western Hemisphere. The 
Doctrine has been variously interpreted, but its basic con-
ception is America for United States Americans. 
4. United States policy in Europe; with minor exceptions, has 
recently been governed by a willingness to accept and follow 
the lead of London. Frequently the United States has been 
consulted by London on issues involving American interests. 
Even where such consultation has not taken place Washing-
ton has tended to follow London. 
5. In A'sia, United States policy has been symbolized by the 
Open Door: profit-seeking for all comers on the same non-
monopoly basis. Such a policy was inevitable in a market so 
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thorDughly dominated by non-United States interests as was 
Asia at the beginning of the present century. 
6. The Pacific Ocean is, a special interest area for the United 
States. There is as. yet no agreement as to' how that special 
interest shall be interpreted. The United States borders the 
Pacific. The construction Df the Panama Canal by the United 
States marked an important step in Pacific development. As 
wartorn Europe falls in relative planetary importance, Asia 
rises relatively. The decline of Europe shrinks the significance 
of the Atlantic in world affairs. The rise of Asia correspond-
ingly enhances the Pacific. The United States' lies between the 
two oceans. There is a strong probability that Pacific contrDI 
will be as significant a determiner of world power in the next 
hundred years as was the control of the Atlantic in the last 
hundred. It is half a century since the United States secured 
the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam and other Pacific stepping 
stones. The Japanese challenge to United States Pacific CDn-
trol has been met with a fierce determination to devastate and 
de-industrialize Japan. 
Recent attempts have been made by Secretary of State Hull and 
other official spokesmen to formulate United States foreign policy 
in terms of democratic ideals, good neighborliness and moral cor-
rectness. Such statements have a certain propaganda value both at 
home and abroad. Thev bear no relation to th~ facts of United 
States foreign policy. If the above analyses of Soviet and United 
States foreign interests and attitudes is correct, it must be abun-
dantly evident that the general interests of the twO' countries. are 
antithetical and that their specific interests are in conflict at a 
number of important points. 
Private individuals have sought to s~pplement or formulate 
American foreign policy in terms of the wDrld power struggle. 
Clarence Streit, for example, in his Union Now: A Proposal for a 
Federal Union of the Leading Democracies (N. Y. Harper 1939) 
advocated a grouping of the world's udemocracies" around a 
British-American nucleus. The same theme was developed by 
W. T. R. Fox in The Super Powers', Fox points out that ttboth 
Britain and Britain's empire are essential to American security 
because they provide the indispensable bases from which threats 
79 
to the United States from Old World aggressors can be stopped 
within the Old World", (p.58) ' He notes that for half a century 
"British interests in the Western Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the 
New World generally have not been supported by units of the 
British Navy for forty years. The basic pattern thus emerges of an 
informal global collaboration in which the Western Atlantic, the 
New World, and the Pacific Ocean area are primary United States 
responsibilities, with Western Europe, the Mediterranean, the 
Middle East, and the Indian Ocean left in the first instance to 
British protection." (Ibid, p. 59). He says that "a specific pro-
posal has been made for enlarging the symbol, tUnited States', so 
that it refers for security purposes at least, to the United States 
plus Great Britain. Can it be further enlarged to include the 
Soviet Union? (Ibid, p. 69) *. Walter Lippman (U. S. War Aims) 
divides the western world into the Atlantic sea powers com-
prising ttthe Atlantic Community", and ttthe land power of Rus-
sia". The Atlantic Community includes besides those countries 
bordering on the Atlantic, Australia, New Zealand, the Philip-
pines, the Union of South Africa, Italy and Greece. In short, the 
British and American Empire plus. their satellites. This Atlantic 
Community ttis the historic centre of the international exchange 
economy." (p. 86) Russia, although bordering on the Atlantic, 
ttexists in and depends upon a region of strategic security separate 
from the Atlantic powers." All three of these authors make 
Anglo-American collaboration the key to future world order. 
Several limitations. upon the Atlantic Community idea should be 
noted. The first is the improbability of continued Anglo-Ameri-
can unity. The second is the drastic weakening of West Europe. 
The third is the progressive disintegration of free enterprise 
economy. The fourth, the rise of the Pacific as the strategic centre 
of planetary life. It is impossible to develop anyone of these four 
themes here. None can be ignored in an evaluation of the Atlan-
tic Community concept as the basis. for American foreign policy. 
United States insistence at the San Francisco Conference upon 
the recognition of regionalism as embodied in the Act of Cha-
pultapec supplemented the division of Europe into regions of 
influence agreed upon at Teheran. The post-war world will evi-
* Quotations by permission of Harcourt, Brace & Company, pulishers. 
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dently be regional in character without any strong central world 
government. The two major poles in this regionally organized 
world will be the United States and the Soviet Union. If British 
policy follows the premise formulated in the Anglo-Soviet Treaty 
of 1942, the British may well be drawn toward the Soviet centre 
of world power. This will create a situation in which the United 
States with its satellites and supporters will face the Soviet U nio11 
with its satellites and supporters. 
The Soviet Union and the United States are not involved in 
any conflicts in the Western Hemisphere. The nearest approach 
to such a situation was the United States support against Soviet 
opposition, for the admission of the Argentine to the San Fran-
cisco Conference. In the Eastern Hemisphere, however, conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet Union has developed , 
over Iran, Poland, Austria, Trieste, Roumania and China. All 
these territories are contiguous to the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
Union is not «interfering" in the Americas. The United States 
is ((interfering" in Eurasia. 
An indication of the tensions growing out of the juxtaposition 
between the Soviet and United States poles of world influence is 
found in the growing chorus of anti-Soviet propaganda. William 
C. Bullitt, former United States Ambassador to Moscow, led off 
with an article in Life, Sept. 4, 1944, in which he virtually said 
that the United States must prepare for war against the Soviet 
Union. Responsible United States spokesmen, including men well 
placed in the Army and particularly in the Navy, for years had 
been taking this position in private. Mr. Bullitt's utterance was 
the first public semi-official statement of the attitude. The anti-
Soviet line has been followed by radio broadcasts, speeches and 
other public pronouncements in which members of Congress, 
prominent newspaper editors and other spokesmen for United 
States business interests have attacked Soviet institutions, de-
nounced Soviet policy in Poland, Austria, Roumania and else-
where, and have begun to rally United States public opinion for 
tithe inevitable conflict." 
Soviet-American conflict is still in its early stages. It exists only 
by implication in Lippman's Atlantic Community. Thus far it has 
not been formulated publicly in the Soviet Union. Prominent 
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United States officials, from the President down, continue to 
insist upon the desirability of United States-Soviet friendship and 
collaboration. There is no escape, however, from two major facts: 
first, the world will emerge from World War II with no central 
governmental authority; second, it will be a two pole world with 
Moscow at one pole and Washington at the other. 
ttWhat then are the prospects for a war between the Soviet 
Eastern power-nucleus and the Anglo-American western aggrega-
tion? If either were to allow the other to consolidate the rimland 
of the Eurasian land-mass under its control, it would also have 
permitted its own power position vis-a-vis to the other to be 
irretrievably damaged. Although a third world war is thus not 
likely to start as a Soviet-Anglo-American war, an attempt by 
either at sole hegemony in non-Russian Europe or Asia would 
almost certainly finish as a Soviet-Anglo-American war. This is 
almost the sole condition under which the two powers would 
become polar opposites in a world war." (Fox, W. T. R. The 
Super Powers, p. 103.) * Fox's statement seems accurate if it is 
subj ect to one amendment. It now seems possible or even probable 
that his first sentence should read tta war beween the Anglo-Soviet 
Eastern power-nucleus and the American western aggregation". 
* By permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Publishers. 
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VI. PEA CEO R WAR FOR THE 
U.S.S.R. 
International political power, in the final analysis, is tested by 
the capacity to wage successful war. In a very real sense, however, 
the success of national policy is in direct proportion to the avoid-
ance of war" particularly of total war, which is so costly to the 
victor as well as to the vanquished. Thus far in our consideration 
of the Soviet role in world affairs we have discussed the power 
position of the Soviet Union and analysed the policies which it 
is pursuing in Europe, in Asia and in its relations with the United 
States. Will ,these policies lead to peace or will they involve war? 
This is one of the fateful political questions of our time. 
Any observer of political events since 1917 must be convinced 
that the Soviet Union wants peace. From those early days immedi-
ately after the revolution when the Russian Socialist Federal 
Soviet Republic was broadcasting to the world: ttClose up your 
ranks, proletarians of all countries, under the flag of peace and 
the social revolution", down to the efforts made 'by the Soviet 
Union to avoid involvement in World War II, Soviet spokesmen 
have been among the world's most vocal advocates of a peaceful 
solution for international tensions and conflicts. 
The Bolsheviks gained power over the Kerensky regime for 
several reasons. One of the principal reasons was the determina-
tion of the Kerensky regime to continue Russia in the war on the 
side of the Allied nations. Bolshevik propaganda demanded the 
cessation of hostilities, the election of delegates by soldiers, farm-
ers and workers, all power to the Soviets so constituted, the con-
vocation of a constituent assembly, the drafting of a constitution 
and the establishment of a world-wide federation of peoples' 
republics. Henri Barbusse edited a book, The S oviet Union and 
Peace, in which many documents dealing with this phase of 
Soviet policy are brought together. 
Since the world revolution did not take place immediately after 
World War I, and since no hope for peace lay in this direction, 
the next formal move of the Soviet Union was an attempt to en-
force those provisions in the League of Nations Covenant which 
R~ 
called for disarmament. It was 1927 before the Disarmament 
Commission in Geneva was seriously discussing the calling of a 
general disarmament conference. Soviet delegations attended this 
and subsequent meetings of the Disarmament Commission, pre-
senting to each session some variant of a disarmament program. 
One Soviet proposal was that "the Conference decides to base its 
proceedings upon the principle of universal, complete disarma-
ment". The Soviet delegation then offered a detailed list of the 
steps necessary to achieve this objective: the destruction of forti-
fications, the liquidation of armies and navies, the disbandment 
of war and navy departments, the cessation of arms manufacture, 
the abolition of military and naval academies, and a number of 
other measures designed to reduce or eliminate war-making pos-
sibilities. On another occasion Soviet delegates proposed that 
forty percent of the world's armaments be eliminated the first 
year, thir.ty percent the second year, and the remaining thirty per-
cent the third year, thus substituting gradual disarmament for 
immediate disarmament. Again, in the interest of the smaller 
nations, Soviet spokesmen advocated disarmament for the great 
powers first, and for the lesser powers only subsequently. 
It goes without saying that these specific disarmament propos-
als received little support in groups composed of admirals, gener-
als and diplomats, all of whom make their living and build their 
reputations as a result of military preparation and the waging of 
war. Furthermore,. the armament business was one of the most 
prosperous and profitable branches of profit-economy, hence the 
sessions of the Disarmament Commission were carefully shep-
herded by well-financed lobbyists of the big armament manufac-
turers who saw to it that any projected arms reduction program 
was effectively pigeon-holed. The Soviet delegations to the Dis-
armament Commission did not achieve their objective of disarma-
ment. On the contrary they saw the inauguration of the arms 
building race that preceded World War II. But they did establish 
for themselves and for the Soviet Union an enviable record as 
advocates of a concrete disarmament program. 
Long befo.re the Disarmament Conference faded out of the 
international picture in 1934 Soviet spokesmen had decided upon 
two courses of action. First, they would accept membership in the 
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League Qf Nations, and second, from that vantage point they would 
advocate a system of collective security based upon the League 
Covenant and implemented by a series of treaties, under League 
auspices, designed to inaugurate an effective scheme for checking 
aggression and thus reducing the probability of war. On Septem-
ber 18, 1934, Litvinov speaking as head of the Russian delegatiQn 
at Geneva said: · 'To many members of the League ten or fifteen 
years ago war seemed to be a remote, theoretical danger and there 
seemed to be no hurry as to' its prevention. Now war must appear 
to all as the threatening danger of tomorrow. The organization of 
peace, for which thus far very little has been dQne, must be set 
against the extremely active organization of war. Everybody knows 
now that the exponents of the idea of war, open promulgators of 
a refashioning of the map of Europe and Asia by the sword, are 
not to' be intimidated by paper obstacles. Peace and security can-
not be organized Qn the shifting sands of verbal promises and dec-
clarations." (League of Nations Official JournalJ Sept. 18, 1934.) 
Another year and Litvinov, again speaking in the League 
Assembly, was urging the immediacy of the war danger and the 
necessity of concrete proposals to avert it. He suggested a Perma-
nent Peace Conference as a substitute for the defunct Disarma-
ment Conference; he suggested immediate, complete disarmament 
as a more practicable step than partial disarmament; he suggested 
League action · 'with a view to the complete outlawing Qf war"; 
he suggested the possibility of a «European Union" as one means 
of adjusting the rising tensions between European nations. Soviet 
spokesmen made further attempts to have the League define 
aggression. In 1934-35 they negotiated treaties with Czechoslo-
vakia and France which were designed to become a multilateral 
pact to guarantee the collective security of Europe. 
This is a considerable catalogue of Soviet peace advances. I pre-
sent it for the purpose of emphasizing the active and persistent 
part taken by Soviet delegations in every conference or assembly 
where they had an opportunity to advance their point of view. 
Sumner Welles sums up the Soviet role during this period: 
«When the Soviet Union entered the League, even the most 
obstinate were soon forced to admit that it was the only major 
power which seemed to take the League seriously. The Soviet 
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Government seemed to believe that the Covenant of the League 
meant what it said. It seemed to feel that the Covenant was not 
to be regarded merely as a screen for the achievement of each 
country's individual and selfish purposes. The Foreign Commis-
sar, Maxim Litvinov ... must be recognized as the only out-
standing European statesman who was consistently right during 
the years between the wars. It was Litvinov's constant appeal that 
'peace is indivisible'; that the purposes of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations could be achieved if the European powers 
complied with its provisions . . . So long as he represented his 
government in the League he strove with all his great ability to 
make the League work." (The Time for Decision p.31) * 
Questions have been raised regarding the sincerity of Soviet 
spokesmen in calling for disarmament and collective security. Did 
the Soviet Union really want peace, or did it aim at a curtailment 
of arms making until it was in a position to out-arm the other 
nations? There are several reasons for believing that the Soviet 
Union had a vested interest in peace and was opposed to any re-
sumption of war activity. In the. first place the Soviet Union was 
led by men and women who had been schooled in the socialist 
tradition of anti-militarism. One of the basic Marxian arguments 
was that profit-making, empire-building, armament and war were 
all parts of a unified pattern which was to be replaced by inter-
national socialism. During the years before 1914 the socialist par-
ties of Europe were among the most vociferous opponents of 
competitive militarism. Second, the Soviet leaders represented a 
new and as yet unstable community just emerging from revolu-
tion and civil war. The stability of this community depended in 
large measure upon a period of peace and relative order that 
would permit concentration on the work of socialist construction. 
In the third place, the energies of the Soviet Union were devoted, 
not to profiteering at home and abroad but to the task of raising 
the standard of community well-being. All three reasons gave the 
Soviet Union a vested interest in peace and a motive for desiring 
to avert another war. 
Soviet spokesmen asked for peace repeatedly and insistently. 
They got war. 
* By permission of Harper and Brothers, publishers, 
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If there was a popular movement anywhere in the world during 
the first quarter of the present century, it was the movement that 
led to the overthrow of the Tzar's regime and the establishment of 
the Soviet Republic. The movement was not only popular in the 
Soviet Union but it commanded worldwide popular support. Here 
lwas a reorganized community engaged in a social experiment of 
vast proportions, seeking peace, bread and freedom. How did the 
)alance of the world react to this effort of the Russian people to lib-
erate themselves from an old tyranny, to free themselves from war 
~nd to launch an effort looking toward worldwide cooperation? 
1. The United States poured out scorn, derision, mendacity. 
2. Japan occupied Manchuria and inaugurated a decade of bor-
der wars. 
3. Great Britain organized the Munich encirclement. 
4. Germany and Italy invaded the Soviet Union. 
Through two decades the Soviet Union attempted by various 
means to establish or to assist in establishing world conditions that 
would ensure peca.(e and collective security. The effort failed. Late 
in the 1930s, as the collapse of their peace policy became more 
and more evident, Soviet officials turned their attention seriously 
to war preparations. They had hoped to live in a peace world. They 
found themselves in a war world and acted accordingly. Today the 
Soviet Union is a world power, playing power politics, not because 
Soviet spokesmen or the Russian people wished to occupy any such 
role, but because they felt that their survival depended upon it. 
In a very real sense, Soviet world policy today is Our Baby. We 
have made it what it is. It is opposed to socialist theory and is 
inimical to Soviet interests as these were conceived for fifteen 
years after the Revolution. Soviet world policy is a departure 
from world socialism and a reluctant adaptation necessitated by a 
ring of armed imperial enemies. 
Having adopted the war-making techniques of the empires, 
the Soviet Union, after the Axis invasion, gave such a good mili-
tary account of itself that it rose in a few months to a position 
as one of the two or three major powers of the planet. Since 1943 
Soviet spokesmen have been consulted on all major United 
Nations policy, and since 1944 the Soviet Union has held the 
diplomatic and military initiative in Europe. 
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NOVI that the European war has been won by the United Nations 
and that the Big Three have succeeded in imposing their program 
of world domination upon the San Francisco Conference, world 
peace and security will depend upon the effectiveness with which 
the Big Three work together. This proposition has been laid down 
and widely accepted since the Teheran Conference in 1943. The 
prospect of military victory carried with it the equally definite 
prospect of world domination by those nations which controlled 
the world's wealth, manpower and armaments. So long as these 
power-holders cooperate, world peace can be enforced and world 
security guaranteed. Soviet policy has thus entered a new phase. 
First it stressed world revolution, then disarmament, then collec-
tive security and now Big Three unity. Implicit in the Big Three 
unity policy, however, is another element-military might. This 
aspect of Soviet policy has been reiterated ever since the surrend-
er of Berlin in May 1945: the Red Army is strong and will 
remain strong; the Red Navy will be strengthened. 
Will Big Three unity provide peace and security for the Soviet 
Union and the planet? The answer, of course, depends upon the 
nature of that unity. How thoroughly are the Big Three united? 
And how long will their union last? 
Officially, the Big Three are united and have been ever since 
their Teheran Declaration of 1943: ttFrom these friendly confer-
ences we look with confidence to the day when all the peoples of 
the world may live free lives untouched by tyranny and according 
to their varying desires and their own consciences. We came here 
with hope and determination. We leave here friends in fact, in 
spirit, and in purpose." The declaration was signed by Roosevelt, 
Stalin and Churchill. Eleven months later Prime Minister Church-
ill was making his. Oct. 27, 1944 report to Commons on his 
Quebec conference with President Roosevelt and his Moscow con-
ference with Marshall Stalin. The enemy, he said, has two hopes: 
first that a long war will wear down the Allies. ttThe second and 
more important hope is that division will arise between the three 
great powers." The Prime Minister assumed the continuance of 
Anglo-American cooperation. As for Russia: ((Our relations with 
the Soviet Union were never more close, intimate and cordial 
than .they are at the present time." (N. Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1944.) 
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Another four months, and President Roosevelt reported to Con-
gress on the Yalta conference of the Big Three: nOn every point 
unanimous agreement was reached ... Never before have the 
major Allies been more closely united-not Dnly in their war aims 
but also in their peace aims. And they are determined to' continue 
to be united." (N. Y. Time's, March 2, 1945.) Do these senti-
ments represent wishful thinking; are they propaganda slogans 
for public consumption, or are they descriptive of political reality ? 
Officially the Big Three are united. Actually, however, there 
are increasing tensions among them. What are the reasons for this 
tension? With the EurDpean phase of World War II ended and 
the end of the Pacific War in sight, will the tensions increase or 
decrease? 
There has been a substantial change in the character of inter-
national tensions during recent years. From 1815 to 1905 inter-
national tensions arose mainly between competing capitalist and 
imperialist groups. Incidentally, there were conflicts between im-
perial and colonial peoples, and within the hDmelands Df some of 
the empires, notably those in Central Europe, minor conflicts oc-
curred between the Drganized wage-workers and their capitalist 
exploiters. Since 1905 the organized working class has pushed 
steadily toward the forefront as a factor in international politics. 
The defeat suffered by Russia at the hands of Japan in the war of 
1904-5 helped to precipitate the Russian Revolution Df 1905. In 
essence, this revolution was an attempt on the part of the Russian 
business classes to win concessions from the ruling semi-feudal 
bureacracy. During its course, hDwever, the Russian workers in 
Petrograd and elsewhere organized soviets and made a definite 
bid for power. At the same. time in other European countries, in 
North America and in Australasia, working class parties were 
winning elections, sending representatives to legislative bodies 
and participating in the fDrmation of ministries. With the Rus-
sian Revolution of 191 7 these new class forces took power in a 
major country, set up and maintained a political regime. Since 
1917, therefore, every international situation has been complicated 
by the actual or possible presence of working class forces. The 
old tensions between competing imperialists have been supple-
mented by new tensions between exploiters and exploited. 
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Tensions between the Big Three contain both elements. On the 
)ne hand, the Big Three are the big Have nations. Britain con-
trols the world's largest empire. The Soviet Union has the larg-
est contiguous territory of any nation in the world. The United 
States possesses the world's largest single unit of wealth and its 
most prolific productive apparatus. These three nations at the 
end of W orId War II will command the thre.e most powerful 
armies, navies and air forces. In terms of old line power politics; 
the Big Three will be the three big centre.s of production, income 
and political might. 
At the same time Britain is ruled by an oligarchy composed of 
hereditary monarchist and aristocratic elements, coordinated with 
a modern business class. The United States is ruled by a business 
oligarchy. In both of these countries private property in the means 
of production is the foundation of the economic pattern and the' 
exploitation of wage labor and the production of commodities for 
profit are the techniques pursued by the ruling oligarchies for their: 
personal enrichment. The Soviet Union, on the other hand. is 
ruled by a bureacracy composed originally of revolutionary leaders' 
and recently augmented by additions from the ranks of technically 
trained economic, military and social directors and managers. Pri-
vate property in the means of production has been abolished, and 
with it has gone the form of exploitation characteristic of Anglo-
American economy. On the surface the members of the Big Three 
are armed sovereign states. In terms of class relationships they 
represent two definitely antithetical social systems. 
Big Three collaboration has passed through several well-marked 
stages. Until 1942 the Soviet Union was hardly considered a nation 
of first-class importance by the Anglo-American leaders. Further-
more, the Soviet Union had signed a collaboration pact with Nazi 
Germany in 1939, and in the same year had launched a war against 
Finland which had resulted in its expulsion from the League of 
Nations and in a widespread anti-Soviet campaign in both Great 
Britain and the United States. The successful defense of Stalingrad, 
Leningrad and Moscow marked a turn in the Soviet fortunes of 
war and led to the Teheran Conference of 1943 at which Soviet 
representatives were for the first time accepted on a parity with 
those from Great Britain and the United States. The war was still 
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in full swing, however, and for another year the Big Three worked 
together with little superficial disharmony, although some sharp 
words were occasionally said about the failure of the western 
powers to develop a second front. The summer of 1944, with its 
successful cross-channel invasion and the rapid advance of the Red 
Armies through southern and central Europe, saw a sharp shift in 
attitudes. Members of the Big Three were no longer working in 
harmony. 
The first official recognition of disharmony was voiced by Prime 
Minister Churchill, in his report to the House of Commons on 
Oct. 27, 1944. The Prime Minister had discussed world affairs 
with President Roosevelt in Quebec and with Marshal Stalin in 
Moscow. Hyou would not expect three great powers so differently 
circumstanced as Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia not 
to have many differences in views about the treatment of the vari-
0us numerous countries into which their victorious armies have 
carried them. The marvel is that all hitherto has been kept so solid, 
sure and sound between us all." Mr. Churchill stated the case ex-
actly. While the Big Three were engaged in a desperate indeter-
minate conflict they were able to maintain a large degree of unity. 
With victory in sight the question of who shall have what, and 
how, took precedence over the problem of survival. 
HThere are great difficulties, but I earnestly hope that they may 
be overcome," said the Prime Minister in the same speech. "The 
most urgent and burning question was, of course, that of Poland, 
and here again I speak words of hope reinforced by confidence. 
To abandon hope in this matter would indeed be to surrender to 
despair." Mr. Churchill added, HI wish I could tell the House 
that we had reached a solution of these problems. It is certainly 
not for the want of trying." 
Twice during the speech Prime Minister Churchill reverted to 
his major theme. On one occasion he said ttThe future of the 
whole world and the general future of Europe, perhaps for several 
generations, depends upon the cordial, trustful and comprehending 
associations of the British Empire, the United States and Soviet 
Russia, and no pains must be spared and no patience grudged 
which is necessary to bring this supreme hope to fruition." At 
another point, after a careful statement of the dangers that would 
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result from disunity among the Big Three: "The future of the 
world depends upon united action in the next few years of our 
three countries. Other countries will be associated but the future , 
depends upon the union of the three most powerful Allies. If 
that fails, all fails. If that succe.eds a broad future for all nations 
may be assured." 
Mr. Churchill stated the case very strongly when he said that 
if the Big Three unity fails "all fails". Certainly his recent experi-
ences at Quebec, and particulary at Moscow, had led him to take 
a very serious view of the possibilities and dangers of Big Three 
disagreement. 
Ten days after Churchill's address to the House of Commons, 
Premier Stalin gave his report at the anniversary of the November 
Revolution. His premises were very much the same as those of 
Mr. Churchill. "There is a talk of differences between the three 
powers on certain security problems. Differences do exist, of 
course. . . . The surprising thing is not that differences exist, 
but that there are so few of them." His outlook for the fuhue 
was cautiously worded. "The alliance between U.S.S.R., Great 
Britain and U.S.A. is founded not on casual and short-lived con-
siderations but on vital and lasting interests. There can be no 
doubt that having stood the strain of over three years of war and 
being sealed with the blood of nations risen in defense of thei~ 
liberty and honor, the fighting alliance of the democratic powers 
will all the more certainly stand the strain of the concluding 
phase of the war." (U.S.S.R. Information Bulletin} Nov. 14, 
1944, p. 4-5.) It is significant that Stalin saw Big Three unity 
continuing through the concluding phase of the war. He does 
not mention post-war possibilities. 
The actual course of events during the first months of 1945 
more than justified the Stalin outlook. The war in Europe was 
not yet over, though it had reached its final stage. The Red 
Armies had been remarkably successful in occupying not only 
Balkan and Polish but also German territory. The Anglo-Ameri-
can forces had been unexpectedly delayed in their penetration of 
Germany. While there was no actual race to reach Berlin, the 
spheres of control in Germany which had already been laid out 
were taken over by the four invading powers. At the same time 
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the future of other parts of Europe and Asia Minor was being 
determined. Here was the supreme test of Big Three unity. They 
had been able to work together during the war. Could they con-
tinue their cooperation when it came to dividing the booty? 
Again and again history has repeated the same story. Military 
alliances among victor nations have dissolved, and frequently 
have ended in conflict, because the allies could not agree upon a 
division of the spoils of war. The Big Three are re-enacting the 
oft-re.peated historical drama. 
Big Three, or Big Five unity has cracked in various directions. 
Good intentions and fair words cannot cover up the rifts which 
first pressed themselves on public attention during the summer of 
1944. There was a formal conflict at Dumbarton Oaks, centering 
about council voting procedure. No agreement was reached and 
the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were published with this note ap-
pearing in parentheses under Section C of Chapter VI: "The 
question of voting procedure in the Security Council is still under 
consideration". This document (Department of State Publication 
2192) was dated Oct. 7, 1944. Five months later, at the Yalta 
Big Three Conference, a voting formula was verbally agreed 
upon, only to be sharply fought out at the San Francisco Confer-
ence seSSIons. 
A second formal issue arose at Dumbarton Oaks. The Soviet 
delegates refused to meet with dele.gates from Chungking. Conse-
quently two conferences were held, the. main conference betNeen 
Britain, the United States and ·the Soviet Union, and a subsequent 
conference between Britain, the United States and China. 
Preparations for the Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago, Nov. 
1, 1944, included the Soviet ynion as a matter of course. A 
Soviet delegation was sent to the Conference, but at the last mo-
ment it withdrew and returned to Russia. The official Soviet Tass 
Agency, in a broadcast on Oct. 29 (N. Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1944) 
explained the withdrawal: "In view of the fact, which has recent-
ly become known, that countries like Switzerland, Portugal and 
Spain have also been invited to the Chicago Conference, countries 
that for many years have conducted a pro-fascist policy hostile to 
the Soviet Union, the representatives of the Soviet Union will not 
take part in this conference." Again the rift was over a matter of 
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procedure. But the Soviet Union, one of the three most important 
air powers, took no part in the Civil Aviation Conference. 
A far more substantial conflict developed during 1944 over 
Persian oil. The matter was sufficiently dealt with in our discus-
sion of Soviet policy in Asia. Here it is only necessary to note 
that the issue still remains unsettled. 
One of the sharpest cleavages between members of the Big 
Three arose over Poland. That issue was discussed in our consid-
eration of Soviet policy in Europe. Through the latter part of 
1944 and the early months of 1945 it remained, as Prime Minis-
ter Churchill described it: Uthe most urgent and burning ques-
tion" dividing the Big Three. 
Not the least urgent among the Big Three controversies was the 
problem of enlarging the triumvirate so that it might include an 
Asiatic and a west European continental power. China was picked 
for Asia because there was no alternative. But which China? For 
years Chungking China, supported by the United States, had been 
making war on Soviet China, backed by the U.S.S.R. 
France, as a member of the United Nations oligarchy, presented 
an even more knotty problem than did China. In November 1943 
Marshal Smuts dismissed France in his speech before the Empire 
Parliamentary Association in London: ((France has gone, and if 
ever she returns it will be a hard and long upward pull for her to 
emerge .again." Difficulties arose between Great Britain and the 
United States over the leadership of a reconstituted France. Britain 
favored de Gaulle; the United States backed Darlan. De Gaulle's 
visits to London and Washington failed to gain concessions from 
either country. After the June 1944 invasion of France, de Gaulle 
was perforce recognized as head of the French Provisional Gov-
ernment. In December 1944 de Gaulle scored an important vic-
tory in the form of the French-Russian Treaty. But when plans 
were being made for the Yalta Conference, the Big Three decided 
not to include de Gaulle, whereupon the French Government 
refused to participate as one of the sponsors of the San Francisco 
Conference. Paris, dissatisfied with the allocation of German ter-
ritory for French occupation seized Italian territory along the 
French-Italian frontier and came close to an open break with 
Great Britain in the Syrian crisis of May-June 1945. 
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There are two other areas of Big Three disunity. The first has 
to do with the administration of Germany, and the second with 
the Pacific War. Theoretically, German administration is in the 
hands of an Allied Control Commission. Practically, each of the 
four occupying powers is going its own way in its own occupa-
tion zone. As for the Pacific War, after years of conflict the 
United States and Great Britain are fighting against Japan, with 
whom the Soviet Union is still allied. 
These specific areas of Big Three disagreement arise not only 
out of divergent interests but more particularly out of the ac-
ceptance of the principles of national sovereignty. During the 
entire history of the United Nations, organized in 1942, the prin-
ciple of national sovereignty has been upheld and defended by 
representatives of all major powers. In the past two years the 
principle has been expanded into regionalism or spheres of influ-
ence, each under the direction of a major power. It seems prob-
able that the regional principle was accepted at Teheran and 
implemented either there or at Yalta by an agreement under 
which the Americas became the United States sphere, East Europe 
became the Soviet sphere, leaving West Europe and the Mediter-
ranean to Great Britain. Active measures were taken by the Soviet 
Union in the summer of 1944 to occupy its area with military 
forces. In December 1944 British action in Greece earmarked that 
country as a part of the British sphere. The United States pro-
ceeded, unchallenged, with its private war on the Argentine and 
immediately before the San Francisco Conference, called together 
a Pan-American group in Mexico City, secured the adoption of a 
regional agreement and carried this agreement to the San Fran-
cisco Conference as an essential element in United Nations 
organization. 
Before the term "regionalism" is accepted, it is important to 
inquire regions of what? These territories were always regions of 
the earth's land mass. Beyond that, they have no significance 
except in so far as they can be dominated by armed, master states. 
If a world government had been established, they might well be 
described as regions under the world authority. But since there 
is no world government, and since each region is sovereign, and 
subject to the will of a master nation, the newly constituted re-
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gion appears as a slightly modified form of the old sphere of in-
fluence, consisting of territory not politically integrated with but 
subject to the dictates of a master state. 
Within their respective regions the Big Three are practicing 
unilateral action in very much the same way that a sovereign state 
acts within its own frontiers. The Soviet handling of Roumania, 
the British handling of Italy and Greece in the autumn of 1944, 
and British action in Syria in 1945, like United States action in 
the Argentine, were accepted just as any domestic action is accep-
ted by the government of a neighbor state. There was obvious 
disagreement between the United States and Russia over Rouma-
nia, and between the United States and Britain over Italy. Protests 
are frequently made, however, when a domestic action of a gov-
ernment infringes the interests of a neighboring government. 
Big Three practices accept unilateral action as normal, within 
designated spheres of influence or regions. United action is by 
special agreement only. The difficulty over the enlargement of the 
Polish Government after Yalta, and the setting up of the Aus-
trian Government by the Soviet Union without consultation, arose 
because the three powers had agreed on a particular formula for 
these cases. 
National sovereignty and regionalism, or master national 
spheres of influence, have both been institutionalized at San Fran-
cisco. In the Security Council each one of the master nations 
holds a veto power which is a guarantee against interference 
within its own area of influence. Each of the master nations also 
retains its arms and its facilities for arms manufacture. The 
United Nations as constituted will be ruled over by a small oli-
garchy of the rich and strong. If this oligarchy is taken to 
include the Big Five it will comprise ten percent of the total 
membership in the United Nations. In reality, of course, the oli-
garchy numbers three and thus comprises something more than 
six percent of the total membership. No provision is made and 
no means are available to protect the interests of small weak 
nations against aggressions by the oligarchy unless all of the 
oligarchs agree on the desirability of such action. 
If the master nations disagree, there will be war. Secretary of 
State Stettinius recognized this fact quite frankly in his radio 
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broadcast of May 28, 1945: nWhat happens if one of the five 
permanent members embarks upon a course of aggression and 
refuses to recognize the machinery of the world organization? 
How can the aggressor be restrained if his 071n contrary vote pre-
vents the Council from invoking force against him? In such an 
event, the answer is simple. Another world war has come, vote 
or no vote, and the world organization has failed." 
This entire analysis permits of but one conclusion. The Soviet 
Union has become part of the Western State System in which war 
has been and still is the accepted means of deciding major issues. 
None of the international conferences recently held has in any 
way modified the basic principles of national sovereignty nor set 
up any institutional means of restraining a master nation from 
going to war when it considers that its interests demand military 
actiO'n. Under these circumstances: 
1. Peace will continue as long as the master nation oligarchy is 
in agreement. 
2. The master nations have been disunited, and on specific issues 
in open conflict since the. summer of 1944 .. 
3. The poles of antagonism are well defined. The post-war world 
will be a twO' pole world divided along lines of national and 
class interests. 
4. It is not yet clear how the lesser powers, and especially Great 
Britain, will group themselves, but it seems inreasingly prob-
able that the Soviet Union will control the major porti03 of 
Europe"s resources and productive tools as well as important 
areas in non-Russian Asia. There is also a possibility if not a 
probability that the British, in line with the policy embodied 
in the Anglo-Soviet Pact of 1942, may cast in their lot with 
the Soviet Union Dn many issues of planet-wide policy. 
5. After the war in the Pacific is ended there will be little de-
mobilization and no disarmament, except of the defeated 
powers. On the contrary, military preparations will be stepped 
up, conscription and military training will both be extended, 
and every effort will be made to' prepare for the next war. 
The U.S.S.R. must fight again, not of her choosing but of the 
necessity which is inherent in the Western State System. Had a 
world government been set up at San Francisco or if there were 
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any immediate prospect of establishing a world government, the 
perspective would be otherwise. With the old established prin-
ciples of national sovereignty still in full force and unrestrained 
by any world state apparatus, it seems· obvious that procedutes 
under the Western State System will continue in the future along 
substantially the same lines that .they have followed in the past. 
One final point should be noted: time works for the Soviet 
Union. A new social order, moving with the social trends and 
self-sufficient to a degree impossible under a profit-price economy, 
should gain in strength with each passing year. Each year that war 
is postponed is one more year in the task of socialist construction. 
Thus the Soviet Union continues to have a vested interest in peace.. 
Only the Soviet Union can afford peace, however. The other 
master nations, dependent upon profit-price economies, cannot 
tolerate it. They can hope to provide full employment only on the 
basis of military preparednes and war. Without full employment 
there is no remote possibility of preserving ·the status quo in free 
enterprise society. Without war, the new social order, represented 
by the Soviet Union, will inexorably outdistance free enterprise 
economy. Thus the system of free enterprise has a vested interest 
in war just as surely as the Soviet Union has a vested !nterest in 
peace. 
The next war within the Western State System will not be ini-
tiated by the Soviet Union. If it becomes a general war with the 
same totalitarian character as World Wars I and II, it will destroy 
free enterprise economy in the Americas as surely as World War 
II crumpled up the same economy in Europe. If the Soviet Union 
can survive the next war it will serve as the prototype of the new 
social order that will replace the Western State System and will 
thus serve as the transfer agent to carry the mechanical and social 
techniques across the chasm that separates the old world order 
from the new. 
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POSTSCRIPT: 
THE GAME OF POWER POLI T ICS 
The topic for this series of discussions is the Soviet role in world 
affairs. Emphasis has been placed on "Soviet" rather than "world 
affairs" because that was the corner of the field that we set out to 
examine. Nevertheless "world affairs" is a far broader and more 
inclusive theme than "Soviet". There were world affairs or inter-
national relations before the Soviet Union came into existence. 
Relations between the nations are older than written history. They 
provide much of the subject matter of history as it is usually pre-
sented. So having devoted an entire lecture series to the Soviet 
aspect of this problem, I want to treat international relations or 
power politics in this brief postscript. Throughout this series of 
talks I have taken the pattern of international life as the back-
ground against which to consider Soviet foreign policy. I have 
neither questioned the pattern nor attempted to evaluate it. Now 
the time has come to describe it briefly and say a few words aBout. 
its social and ethical import. 
In our last discussion of Peace or War for the Soviet Union I 
attempted to show that Soviet spokesmen first opposed the inter-
national pattern in principle, then tried to modify some of its more 
objectionable features and only as a last resort adjusted their 
policy to its total-war standards. One of the earliest acts of the 
Bolshevik Government was to propose a worldwide revolution that 
would overthrow capitalist states and empires, and substitute for 
them a world government organized by representatives of the 
world's peoples. Such a move, if successful, would have replaced 
competing nationalisms and imperialisms by a coordinated and 
perhaps by a cooperative world community. 
Bolshevik efforts in this direction failed. Consequently we find 
ourselves today living under a system of world politics that is 
practically the same in principle as it was when men plodded along 
mud roads behind horses and oxen, moved across water in sailing 
ships, and spoke to each other only by word of mouth or by letter 
and printing press. 
Shelves of books have been written about world politics. R. P. 
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Dutt's World Politics (N. Y.: International, 1936) is a good 
treatment of the subject from the left. N. J. Spykman's America's 
Strategy in World Politics (N. Y.: Harcourt, 1942) presents 
the theme in geo-political terms. F. L. Schuman's International 
Politics (N. Y., McGraw Hill, 1933) is a standard college. text-
book. These and scores of other recent studies explain the work-
ings of world politics or power politics. One of these days I shall 
prepare a series of lectures on this theme. Right now I should like 
to present a thumb-nail sketch of the subj ect. 
1. World politics or power politics. is intercourse-peaceful or 
warlike-between governments of sovereign states. 
2. In the absence of a world government, with sovereign power, 
the planet is essentially law-less. Each nation makes its. own 
laws, and formulates its own policies often with little or no 
regard for the well-being of its neighbors who are engaged in 
like nationalist practices. Under such a set-up, friction and 
conflict are inevitable, and the ultimate decisions are made by 
a resort to war. 
3. Business for profit and the will to power both drive national 
policy makers into. a competitive struggle for economic, politi-
cal and social advantage or privilege. 
4. Urged on by this drive, individuals already rich strive to aug-
ment their wealth, and powerful nations seek additional power. 
5. Recent centuries of world power struggle have involved: 
a. World supremacy for a series of nations: Spain, Holland, 
France, Britain, 
b. Gained through the defeat and often through the destruc-
tion of their rivals, 
c. And through the extension, by armed force, of imperial 
control over dependent and colonial peoples. 
d. Some colonial people like the English colonies of North 
America and the Spanish and Portuguese colonies of Latin 
America have thrown off the yoke of empire and become 
sovereign states, competing in .their turn for wealth and 
power. 
e. The power struggle has been wage.d with all of the 
weapons in the hands of the power seekers. War has been 
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going on in some part of the empire-dominated world 
about nine years out of every ten. 
6. The international power struggle is carried on ruthlessly. It is 
impossible to understand the game of p071er politics unless 
you remember that it has no rules, no ethics and no morals. 
It is a life and death grapple in which no holds are barred. 
7. The power politics game goes on incessantly between foreign 
ministers and other government agents who sneak, spy, 
double-cross, cheat, lie, bribe, steal, burn and kill to advance 
the interests of ttour country" and to out-maneuver the 
"enemy" (all other countries). 
8. At irregular intervals, when small scale spying, cheating, 
double-crossing, lying, debauchery, ,theft, incendiarism and 
murder will no longer secure the desired results, the total 
resources of the fatherland are mobilized against the enemy. 
Economy, science, the radio, the press, the screen, the school, 
the church and every other available agency are pressed into 
service for a campaign of organized destruction, rapine and 
mass murder called total war. 
9. Since the final test of success in the power-politics game is 
military victory, no pains are spared to destroy, burn and kill 
to the utmost. Recently developed mechanical and automatic 
weapons enable the users to wipe out towns and cities in a 
few hours and to devastate entire countries in a few months. 
10. Military victory carries with it the right to appropriate the 
movable property of the vanquished; to take title to the nat-
ural resources within enemy territory; to humiliate, enslave, 
execute. Glory to the victor! Woe to the vanquished! ' 
11. This is the power politics game-the sport of kings and the 
king of sports. Not only does it make or ruin individuals, but 
it creates and annihilates nations and entire cultures. 
12. Our best people dedicate their talents and their lives to the 
game of power politics. Those who lead their fellows to victory 
are acclaimed and honored. Those who lead their fellows to 
defeat are usually cursed and forgotten. Power-hungry, cynical, 
greedy, ignorant, cruel manipulators, in the name of defense, 
patriotism, national honor, survival, sacrifice the happiness and 
well-being of multitudes on the altar of greed and violence. 
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Through the ages thinkers and teachers. have tried to formulate 
rules of conduct under which human life would be dignified and 
exalted. They have spoken of understanding, sympathy, compas-
sion, brotherhood; of devotion to truth, beauty and goodness; of 
generosity, sharing, cooperation. Judged by any such standards, 
power politics is a dirty game, unworthy the time and energy of 
any man or woman of good -will. 
Civilized communities have deified the state and have accepted 
the power-politics game as a necessary accompaniment of state 
sovereignty. The absence of rules, ethics and morals in the game 
has been excused on the grounds that (1) ttIt is our country, 
right or wrong", (2) ttEverybody is doing if', and (3)1 t(We are 
in it now and we must go through with it". Spokesmen for this 
pattern of western life conveniently forget that ttthey who take 
the sword, perish by the sword' '-. victor and vanquished alike. 
Yet this must be true, because war is waged between groups of 
human beings in terms of fear, hate, deliberate devastation and 
premeditated, planned killing. 
No community can hope to endure which does not establish and 
maintain social standards that conserve and build. The power poli-
tics game is organized and played in terms of destruction. 
No community can hope to endure. which does not develop 
techniques of cooperation and mutual aid. Power politics prac-
tices cutthroat competition. 
No community can hope to endure which does not work out 
ethical and moral codes under which human decencies are pre-
served, human worthiness is elli~anced and men learn the hard 
lesson of live and help live. Power politics is based on the assump-
tion that every person across the frontier is a potential enemy, to 
be suspected, feared and hated in peacetime and in wartime, to be 
murdered at the command of the state. 
Power politics contravenes every concept of popular sovereign-
ty, every principle of fair dealing, every code of udo unto others", 
every teaching of brotherhood. Either we follow the precepts laid 
down bv the leading ethical teachers or else we take part in the 
power politics game. There is no middle way. 
Soviet leaders entered the power politics game not because they 
liked it but because they felt that there w;.s no alternative. They 
102 
have been calling for another game, with decent rules and new 
players. How can any man or woman of good will fail to sympa-
thize with Soviet spokesmen in their heroic efforts for world peace 
and security and to afford them every assistance in their struggle 
to replace power politics by a planned, ordered, governed world 
community? 
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